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With rapid urbanization, environmental problems like green space shortage and urban 
flooding become prevalent. Identifying effective policymaking and implementation is 
critical in order to solve these problems. This dissertation addresses four theoretical topics 
in the context of urban green infrastructure: policy entrepreneur, institutional response to 
club goods, quasi-public-private partnership, and policy goal ambiguity. Each is 
exemplified by a causal case study. Data were collected through participant observation, 
field trips, semi-structured interviews, and crowdsourcing.  
Chapter 1 takes a longitudinal perspective and examines the dual role of policy 
entrepreneur and policy implementer in reaching the final policy goal of mandating vertical 
greening in the law in Shanghai (1992-2016). Usually, policy implementer and policy 
entrepreneur are two distinct identities and studied separately. This paper provides an 
unusual counterexample, exploring how the two intertwined identities may influence the 
entrepreneurial strategies and further influence the incremental policymaking process.  
Chapter 2 illustrates how government involvement may facilitate club-good development 
by investigating the nascent for-profit shopping mall roof garden (SMRG) development. 
SMRGs, established by developers to provide an amenity to mall customers, are in nature 
club goods. Although the government appreciates SMRGs given their positive externalities 
(e.g., recreation, stormwater mitigation), existing public policies fail to respond to SMRGs’ 
cross-sector nature, leaving significant financial, legitimacy, and oversight gaps 
unattended. The research suggests that government involvement can better facilitate club-
goods’ sustainable development by creating an enabling institutional environment, which 
includes optimized policy design and coordinated cross-department collaboration. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the rarely studied phenomenon of the Quasi-Public Private 
Partnership (QPPP) in non-liberal societies. This work offers a general definition of Quasi-
PPPs and identifies factors that influence the PPP to QPPP transition. In the case of eco-
environmental service provision, the PPP-QPPP transition occurred in two stages. First, 
the eco-environmental service partnerships, initially established as PPPs, became 
xiii 
 
inoperable with inexperienced partners and unsupportive markets. Second, with financial 
bailouts from the government, the private partner became a subordinated partner in a 
consortium between private partners and State-Owned Enterprises, and PPPs transitioned 
to QPPPs. In a non-liberal society, when the three critical PPP assumptions are violated 
(competent partners, supportive market, and horizontal partner structure), PPPs are more 
likely to transition to QPPPs. 
Chapter 4 examines how policy goal ambiguity influences policy implementation 
outcomes, exemplified by the Sponge City Program (SCP) implementation. SCP is a 
centrally-initiated program, requiring mainly the use of green instead of gray infrastructure 
to manage urban stormwater. When implemented top-down, three cross-level, layered 
goals of sustainability, stormwater management, and resident satisfaction became 
incoherent and vague in terms of priority and measurement. The research demonstrates that 
in a program with multiple policy goals, the goal priority ambiguity allows implementers 
the discretion to decide the order of goals to manage interest conflicts. Moreover, the goal 
measurement ambiguity allows implementers to decide the degree of their commitment to 
each goal, and to interpret the desired performance of a goal. Such ambiguity-caused 
discretions drastically inhibit the achievement of the sustainability policy goal.    
Keywords: policy development, green infrastructure, policy entrepreneur, club goods, 










By 2050, about 70% of the world population will live in cities, which points to the 
importance of sustainable city development (Dixon, Eames, Hunt, & Lannon, 2014). Urban 
green infrastructure (GI), an interconnected network of open green space including parks, 
green corridors, urban woodlands, community gardens, and roof greening, are regarded as 
a valuable natural resource contributing to sustainable cities (Benedict & McMahon, 2002; 
Hunter & Luck, 2015; Tzoulas et al., 2007). GI plays a critical role in addressing many 
urban environmental problems such as improving air quality, mitigating the greenhouse 
effect, managing urban stormwater, and providing recreational spaces for residents. In this 
dissertation, the term GI refers to all urban green spaces as differentiated from the gray 
infrastructure (sewer and stormwater lines, treatment plants, and roads). In China, rapid 
urbanization over recent decades has increased the agglomeration and compactness of 
urban land use (Mu, Mayer, He, & Tian, 2016), creating a shortage of green space shortage 
and increased urban flooding. For instance, despite continuous efforts of the local greening 
administration, the public green space per capita in Shanghai remains extremely low; only 
4.6 m2 in 2000 (Hu, 2001). In addition, with the dual effects of climate change and the 
increasing percentage of impervious surfaces, urban flooding has become more frequent 
and more extreme (Hallegatte, Green, Nicholls, & Corfee-Morlot, 2013). For example, in 
2012, Beijing was hit with one of the heaviest rainstorms in the past 60 years, resulting in 
79 deaths, crippling the transportation network, and leaving thousands of homes flooded 
(Xu, 2015).  
This research focuses specifically on how to use GI to solve these urban environmental 
problems, especially urban greenspace shortage and urban flooding. To deal with them, the 
Chinese central government enacted two milestone programs. The first is the 1992 
‘National Garden City’ campaign launched by the Ministry of Construction to encourage 
cities to improve urban ecosystems and build livable cities (Jin, Chen, & Ma, 2015). 
Accordingly, many cities, like Beijing, Nanjing, Hefei, etc., have taken stock of their 
existing urban GI and tried to increase their urban green space to meet the Garden City 
standards (Huang, Yan, & Wu, 2016). Cities with severe land-use conflicts, including 
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Shanghai, have resorted to new forms of above-ground vertical greening, including green 
roofs and green walls. Vertical greening can be an effective supplementary approach to 
increase urban greening where land values are at a premium.  
The second program is the 2014 Sponge City program, which proposes to use GI to 
sustainably manage urban stormwater and reduce the dependency on gray infrastructure, 
by increasing infiltration of rainwater and preserve water resources during times of drought 
(Li, Ding, Ren, Li, & Wang, 2017). Greening measures promoted under this program 
include green roofs, rain gardens, and bio-retention swales. GI, in addition to the 
recognized recreational function, is thus supposed to play a role in urban stormwater 
management. This new form and the new role of GI leads to challenges in both ideology 
and empirical practice.  
Environment-friendly city development can be expensive and challenging. For instance, 
the Sponge City program requires an investment as high as 100-150 million CNY/km2, 
which is a considerable financial burden for local governments (Li et al., 2017). Moreover, 
GI development in cities always involves severe land-use conflict, as many GI projects are 
installed on non-public lands (Chini, Canning, Schreiber, Peschel, & Stillwell, 2017; Ryan, 
Fábos, & Allan, 2006). For this reason, the central government launched a Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) policy in 2014 to encourage the private sector to engage and invest in 
the nation’s sustainable city initiatives (Tan & Zhao, 2019).  
This dissertation examines the local-level policymaking and policy implementation 
pertaining to these initiatives. In the four substantial chapters, each chapter addresses one 
theoretical topic: policy entrepreneur, institutional response to club goods, quasi-public-
private partnership, and policy goal ambiguity. Each is exemplified by a causal case study. 
The first chapter addresses how the policy implementer acted as a policy entrepreneur 
dedicating to green roof policy change in Shanghai. The second chapter examines how 
institutional response may improve the club good (shopping mall roof garden) provision 
when the private sector is engaged in club-based green space provision. The third chapter 
investigates how a PPP policy transitioned to a Quasi-PPP when three basic PPP 
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assumptions were violated and failed to reap the PPP benefits. The fourth chapter focuses 
on how policy goal ambiguity influences the policy outcome in the top-down Sponge City 
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Abstract 
Both the policy entrepreneur and policy implementer play critical roles in the policy 
process. Policy entrepreneurs have been regarded as a main driver of agenda-setting and 
policy change. Policy implementers are decisive in spotting problems associated with 
implementation and ensuring policy-goal attainment. Yet, little attention has been devoted 
to how the overlap of these two identities may influence agenda-setting and policy 
adoption. This paper addresses this gap using a qualitative case study approach and 
explores the vertical greening (VG) policymaking process in Shanghai (1992-2016), China. 
In this case, the head of the Shanghai Greening Committee (SGC, the municipal 
greenspace-policy implementer) acted as a de facto policy entrepreneur, and skillfully 
employed incremental strategies to advance the VG policy agenda forward through three 
phases. This paper advances three conclusions. (1) The identity of policy implementer 
prompts the entrepreneurial tactics by detecting the barriers in implementation and 
motivates the policy entrepreneur to remove these barriers. (2) The discrepancy in 
perception of the policy-goal ambiguity between the policy implementer and policymaker 
may compromise policy adoption. (3) The dual identity does not prevent the policy 
entrepreneur from maintaining a flexible attitude to accept compromises in order to have 
the policy passed.  
Keywords:  policy entrepreneur; policy implementer; dual role; vertical greening policy; 
Shanghai; China 





Policy entrepreneurship is often regarded as a causal mechanism of agenda-setting 
(Hopkins, 2016) and driver of policy change (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). Entrepreneurs 
are often at the center of U.S. environmental policy innovation, building coalitions to 
advance their cause using a variety of resources (Rabe, 1999). Another important actor in 
the policy process is the policy implementer, who carries out the established public 
policies. Their skills and commitment, and capability to adapt the policy to local 
conditions, enable policy goal attainment (Matland, 1995). Given the local implementers’ 
deep understanding and knowledge of on-the-ground problems, they are often in a better 
position to initiate purposeful policy. 
Here we examine how policy adoption is affected by a policy implementer’s 
experience combined with a policy entrepreneur’s strategies, in an in-depth case study of 
urban vertical greening (VG) in Shanghai, China. Although in practice, policy 
implementers initiating and advocating for specific policies is not uncommon, theoretical 
exploration of this situation has not been given equal attention. Bakir (2009) examines how 
the policy entrepreneur’s multiple high-profile identities as decision-maker, theorist, 
framer, and mediator (plus a considerable influence in transnational and domestic policy 
communities) enables the entrepreneur to operate in different ideational realms towards 
desirable institutional change. Frisch-Aviram, Cohen, and Beeri (2018) found that the low-
level bureaucrats who implement the policy can influence the shaping of policy through 
their professional knowledge and understanding the needs of the public; yet their research 
focused more on how the governance regime affects the ability of these bureaucrats to act 
as policy entrepreneurs. We contribute to the literature by investigating how the identity as 
a local policy implementer may influence the entrepreneurial efforts towards the policy 
change of an esoteric issue in a centralized political regime. This paper argues that this dual 
identity has both pros and cons, but does not prevent the policy entrepreneur from making 
progress in the specific political context. For the following parts, first, we review the 
literature on both policy entrepreneur and policy implementer, followed by the 
methodology. We then identify the problem and the policy entrepreneur, detailing the 
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policy entrepreneur’s strategies in the three-phase VG policymaking process in Shanghai. 
Finally, we discuss and summarize our main findings. 
1.2 Policy entrepreneur and policy implementer 
The concept of policy entrepreneur is well defined (Kingdon, 1995) as are their 
strategies (Cairney, 2018; Faling, Biesbroek, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, & Termeer, 2018; 
Mintrom & Norman, 2009). Mintrom and Norman (2009) use a four-element framework 
which includes problem defining, social acuity displaying, team building, and leading by 
example, to identify policy entrepreneurs and analyze their strategies. In a similar vein, 
Faling et al. (2018) identify five categories of frequently-adopted entrepreneurial 
strategies: issue promotion, issue framing, coalition building, manipulating institutions, 
and leading by example. These entrepreneurial strategies are well elaborated in case 
studies. For instance, Meijerink and Huitema (2010) examine how policy entrepreneurs 
use smaller-scale implementation to gain experience with proposed policies.  
Although the concept of policy entrepreneur originated in democratic political 
systems, it has proved to be applicable to non-democratic regimes like China (Hammond, 
2013). He (2018) finds that personal traits, political capital, network position, and 
institutional framework influence the entrepreneurial activities in the medical system 
reform in Sanming, China. Zhu (2008) explores how policy entrepreneurs used the strategy 
of technical infeasibility to push policy change for urban vagrants and beggars in China. 
However, Hammond (2013) finds that existing frameworks do not completely explain the 
Chinese minimum living guarantee policy process, and advocates for more research on the 
applicability of policy entrepreneur frameworks to determine whether modifications are 
necessary in the Chinese context.  
Compared to the policy entrepreneurs, less attention is devoted to policy implementers 
(Kingdon, 1995; Zahariadis, 2014). Policy implementation usually depends on civil 
servants and administrative officials to enact the policy, though other non-government 
actors may also be involved (Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009). Here we highlight two 
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factors that may influence implementation: policy-goal ambiguity and public support for 
the policy.  
According to Noordegraaf (2010), policy formation implies intricate politico-
administrative interactions between politicians and policy administrators. The former, 
including the policymaker, contributes interests and values; the latter, including policy 
implementers, focuses on facts and knowledge. It is expected that high-rank decision-
makers will provide implementers with clear policy goals and directions, which is not 
always the case (Howlett et al., 2009). Cairney and Kwiatkowski (2017) maintain that 
many policymakers do not fully understand the policy problems they must address. They 
may also choose ambiguous solutions to ill-defined problems to take advantage of a policy 
window (Cairney, 2018).  
Public support for a policy can influence both policy adoption (Cairney, 2018) and 
policy implementation (Howlett et al., 2009). Sometimes the government may want to keep 
the issue esoteric or simply to transfer it from a political debate into a more technical 
concern in order to ease the public concern or reduce opposition (Bakir, 2005). While in 
other cases, either the government or the advocates may try to make the esoteric issue more 
public, meanwhile to promote their pet solution (Faling et al., 2018). In Philadelphia, 
Madden (2010) found that the policy entrepreneur advocated for the use of green 
infrastructure for urban stormwater mitigation through the media. Similarly, in Cleveland, 
officials found that media attention on an unsuccessful stormwater mitigation project 
resulted in a bad relationship with the public, making it difficult to justify the project 
expenditures and further impeded policy implementation (Keeley et al., 2013). In China, 
the media is usually employed as an instrument to propagate political ideology and public 
policies (Pan, 2000). The way the mass media prioritizes certain issues influences the 
public’s judgment and acceptance (Wang, 2008). 
There are increasing appeals for more interaction between policymaking and policy 
implementation. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) argued that the policy-formation 
process provides implementers critical clues about the intensity of demands, and the size, 
stability, and degree of consensus among those demanding change. Winter (1986) found 
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that many implementation barriers occur at the initial stages of the policymaking process, 
especially policy formulation. It is often more effective for policy-makers to deliberate the 
implementation challenges and response ex-ante instead of ex-post (Linder & Peters, 
1990). Matland (1995) suggests that local policy implementers can propose new policies 
given their knowledge of policy problems and context. Given our current understanding of 
the role of policy entrepreneurial activities and policy implementation feedbacks, it would 
be prudent to examine these roles from an integrated perspective.  
1.3 Methodology  
We employ a case-study approach to analyze the VG policymaking process in 
Shanghai, which is the first city in China to mandate VG. Our focus on Shanghai is due to 
its pioneering performance in VG policymaking, and because the lead author has 
professional experience in Shanghai’s landscape industry and thus has developed good 
interpersonal networks allowing for relatively easier access to the potential key informants 
and data. This privileged access enables the author to achieve a greater depth of knowledge 
than available from superficial official accounts, and better understand the perception and 
motivation of the key protagonists (Rhodes & Noordegraaf, 2007). 
        The empirical data are collected from both primary and secondary sources. In order 
to better understand elite behavior and avoid getting non-neutral and biased answers, we 
collected first-hand data through participant observations/shading managers and semi-
structured interviews (Noordegraaf, 2014). Between 2008-2016, the author attended the 
annual Shanghai International Vertical Greening and Building Greening Exhibitions to 
observe the public and market response to VG. Field trips to the VG projects in the Expo 
2010 Shanghai, as well as engagement in the program of 2016 Top-100 VG projects 
ranking, demonstrated how the SGC tried to arouse public interest in VG through mass 
media. Other observing opportunities include listening to Li’s speech or luncheon 
conversations with Li at some meetings etc.  
       Key-informant interviews at both city and district levels were conducted. In January 
2016, the lead author conducted in-depth interviews with the key protagonist, the director 
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of SGC (Li Li), as well as the vice director (Guoqiang Sun), in the office of Shanghai 
Administration of Greening and City Appearance (SAGCA). Interview questions include 
why they were interested in VG, what kind of strategies were used to advance the policy 
agenda, how important city events may have influenced the VG policy, and why they 
wanted to mandate VG in the law. Another critical city-level interviewee is Xiangmao Li, 
municipal VG project supervisor of the Shanghai Station of Landscape Management, who 
is in charge of the quality and financial incentive of VG projects and has close contact with 
district implementers. Questions concerning the compilations and implementation of 
technical standards and the evaluation of the financial incentive plan were asked. Though 
VG is proposed city-wide, usually it is more popular in the densely-populated urban center. 
To have a comprehensive picture of the VG implementation, the lead author also 
interviewed district-level SGC officials from both urban districts of Jing`an, Zhabei, 
Changning, Yangpu and suburban districts of Minhang, Chongming and Fengxian. 
Questions about the challenges for districts when each is assigned the heavy annual task of 
VG area-development and about the entrepreneurial efforts of Li Li were asked. These 
district-level interviewees are frontline policy implementers. They have the best 
knowledge about VG policy implementation, and they report directly to municipal SGC, 
or Li.  
We collected secondary data from open sources including official documents and 
government websites. This included annual data for the VG area from the Yearbook of 
Shanghai Greening and City Appearance and presented in Figure 1.1, and VG technical 
standards from official documents including policy booklets and white papers, as well as 
the official website of SAGCA and displayed in  Table 1.1. We gathered data about the 
VG public education and awareness-raising activities from mass media, including Xinmin 
Evening News, Jiefang Daily, and the internet media of Sina.com.cn and Eastday.com and 
showed in Table 1.2.  
The interviews were recorded and transcribed. Since the research involves 
information spanning over two decades, sometimes the interviewees could only provide 
the name or keywords of an event. Therefore, to verify the accuracy and to probe further 
into the details, we often turned back to the documents. The respondents were allowed to 
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confirm the transcripts. We also triangulated all the data collected from observation, 
interview, and document review for validity. 
1.4 Severe urban greenspace shortage and identifying the policy 
entrepreneur  
        The compact-city urbanization model in China has led to intense land-use conflict, 
which squeezes out necessary urban greenspace. In response, the Chinese Ministry of 
Construction launched a ‘National Garden City’ campaign in 1992 (Jin, Chen, & Ma, 
2015). One criterion of the campaign requires that a candidate city’s ground-level public 
greenspace area reaches at least 5 m2 per capita; while in 1993, Shanghai’s was only 1.15 
m2 (Hu, 1994). In the following years, the Shanghai Garden Administration, especially its 
in-house department of Shanghai Greening Committee (SGC, responsible for municipal 
greenspace development), together with SGC’s branches in each district, worked to 
increase urban greenspace to meet the ‘Garden City’ target. Besides ground-level 
greenspaces, VG (which includes green walls, green roofs, and other forms of above-
ground greening measures) was proposed to address the urban greenspace shortage.  
        After a decade’s efforts, in 2003, Shanghai was finally entitled ‘Garden City’ when 
the greenspace reached 7.6 m2 per capita (Jin et al., 2015).  The Garden City criteria were 
not only an indicator of the city’s greenspace shortage, but a reminder of how difficult and 
expensive ground-level green space development could be in urban areas. For instance, to 
develop the Yanzhong greenspace, which covered an area of 28 ha in the city center, the 
government relocated over 10,000 households and 400 enterprises. The cost of land 
acquisition alone was as high as 120 million Yuan/ha (Hu, 2018). The financial challenges 
further inspired SGC to try out VG, which saved land-acquisition costs. At that time, VG 
was an esoteric topic and the central government neither paid much attention to nor 
included it in the national Garden City criteria. Thus, VG policymaking was at the 




        Macro political setting may indirectly influence agenda setting through the emergence 
of policy entrepreneurs. Araral and Amri found that in non-liberal democracies, “policy 
actors like think tanks, interest groups and media may not play similarly important roles in 
shaping the policy agenda as in mature liberal democracies” (2016, p. 80) and the exclusion 
of outside actors potentially inhibits outside policy entrepreneurs. This is largely true in 
China (Zhu, 2008), though in recent years the rise of the internet has made popular pressure 
a strong force in agenda setting (Wang, 2008). However, for VG, as a kind of public good 
with largely indirect and chronical economic or social benefits, there are rarely outside 
interest groups or lobbyists involved. 
Nevertheless, in the following policy development process, a proactive insider, the 
head of the SGC, Li Li, was a key actor. She devoted considerable time and energy to 
continuously influence policymaking towards its desirable outcome: legitimizing the VG 
in the municipal greening law. Li, a native of Shanghai was a horticultural specialist, who 
worked in the Shanghai Botanical Garden and the Shanghai Station of Landscape 
Management for years before she was promoted to work for the then Shanghai Garden 
Administration in 1998 until her retirement in 2016. In almost two decades, she 
strategically maneuvered the VG development and policy agenda, from VG policy 
experimentation to institutionalize VG in the law. Her efforts to promote VG included 
giving speeches at important conferences, organizing demonstration-site field trips to 
familiarize the district-level officials with VG, inviting researchers including the lead 
author of this paper to conduct studies on foreign VG policies, and compiling brochures as 
propaganda material to educate the public. 
Her work-related identity transition from a technical expert to a public manager 
implied new managerial knowledge and skill learning. When Li became head of SGC, she 
paid a great deal of attention to team building. During the interview with Li, she invited 
SGC’s deputy director to join her and emphasized several times that if there is any 
achievement in Shanghai’s VG development, it was attributable to the efforts of the whole 
team instead of herself alone. Though challenging, Li was persistent and always kept 
encouraging her team. This was particularly the case during the World Expo 2010 
Shanghai. There, she urged SGC members to get out of the office to visit and study the 
13 
 
Expo VG as much as possible. When mentioning that more professionals are now engaged 
in VG research and development, Li said: ‘compared with our initial stumbling years to 
introduce VG in the city, the situation becomes much better now.’ Many other interviewees 
determined that without Li, VG development and policymaking in Shanghai may have 
never materialized. Thus, Li can, according to Kingdon’s definition (1995), be considered 
as a policy entrepreneur of the Shanghai VG policy. Her entrepreneurial efforts can be 
divided into three phases. 
Phase 1: Policy experimentation and feedback from pilot projects 
        When promoting new technologies or new concepts, policy entrepreneurs usually 
conduct small-scale experimentation to gain experience (Faling et al., 2018; Mintrom & 
Norman, 2009). Li started VG by establishing pilot projects and policy experimentation at 
the district level. Jing`an, a district in the city center with a high population density, had 
the strongest motivation to install VG to partially mitigate land-use conflicts. Since 2001, 
Li worked with Jing`an SGC to build 47 VG demonstration sites. Most pilot projects were 
implemented on public buildings, particularly governmental buildings. Li also directed the 
Jing`an SGC in institutionalizing roof greening. In 2002, the first VG policy at the district 
level, the Implementation Opinion on Roof Greening of Jing`an District, Shanghai (Trial) 
(People's Government of Jing`an District, 2002) was formulated and put into effect. This 
policy incentivizes all new buildings or feasible retrofitting projects for green roofs at 10 
Yuan/m2, making it eligible for the award of ‘Advanced Unit in Greening’.  
Working models for proposed changes can help provide important information about 
program effectiveness and practicality (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). The pilot projects and 
the trial policy in Jing`an brought both positive and negative feedback to SGC. On the 
positive side, the demonstrations encouraged several districts to mimic the efforts, though 
still in small scales (H. M. Lu, 2016). By October 2004, there was about 12 ha of rooftop 
greened in Shanghai (Yang, Zhang, & Nie, 2008). The trials also enriched SGC’s 
experiences and made Li more confident in VG development. Nevertheless, these positive 
influences on insiders do not necessarily ease the prevailing public concerns. 
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Barriers arising from policy experimentation 
        Several barriers were identified during the policy experimentation phase. The first 
involved legal support. Although VG occurs above ground level, it does require usage 
rights of structures including roofs or walls.  For example, when proposing VG projects, 
SGC officials first have to persuade the occupants/developers to allow the roof or wall to 
be greened. Usage rights involve different parties, including developers, property 
management companies, and occupants. Most of these parties are not from the greening 
sector and are not knowledgeable about VG. The second barrier is technical in nature. 
Occupants worry about the load-bearing potential of the building, the plant root 
penetration, mosquitoes and insects, and how to keep the roof greenings safe during 
typhoon seasons. The third regards funding, specifically responsibility for installation and 
management costs. While ground-level greenspace projects are usually included in annual 
government budgets, VG installations are not. Ignoring land acquisition costs, VG’s 
installation and maintenance costs are higher than ground-level greenspaces (Claus & 
Rousseau, 2012). The fourth is an assumed low social-environmental value.  Many of the 
pilot green roofs are not open to the public and are not designed for recreation. Their 
inaccessibility and invisibility made roof greening less attractive to the public. Some 
professionals also doubted the ecological benefits of roof greening, which at that time 
usually contained only light-weight sedums and grasses (R. Li, 2007). 
Phase 2: Policy amendment to encourage VG in the municipal law 
Li realized the above-mentioned concerns may directly or indirectly impede VG 
development. Meanwhile, she was also eager to upgrade the district-level policy to the city 
level to legalize VG and spark a VG trend in the city. From an implementer’s perspective, 
representing VG in the law will make the VG policy implementation more 
legitimate.  However, before Li had time to solve these problems, she identified an 
unexpected policy window from the agency merger.    
Seize the first policy window without solving the implementation barriers 
15 
 
Rapid urbanization brought about not only greenspace shortage, but also greenspace 
administrative challenges in Shanghai. Successful green space policy often requires the 
integration of regional governmental units that oversee greening and urban planning (Ma, 
2007). In 2004, the two greening authorities, the Shanghai Gardening Administration (for 
urban areas) and the Shanghai Agriculture and Forestry Administration (for rural areas) 
merged and became the ‘Shanghai Greening Administration’. Soon after, the greening law 
Shanghai Regulations of Planting and Greening (which did not mention VG at all) was 
proposed for amendment to adapt to the post-merging administration. This unintentionally 
created an opportunity for a VG policy window. 
In 2005, the new Shanghai Greening Administration set out to amend the greening 
law. Li saw a great opportunity to put VG on the institutional agenda. Given the above-
mentioned implementation barriers, she proposed two modest clauses about VGs for the 
amendment: (1) to encourage VG in the city; (2) to require that new public buildings with 
feasible structures undergo roof greening. As to the second clause, this city-level law is not 
as strict as the Jing`an policy, which requires all new roofs to be greened. SGC’s proposal 
was accepted and in 2007 the old regulation, which had been in effect for 20 years, was 
amended and renamed ‘Shanghai Greening Regulations’. This is the first time that VG was 
represented in the municipal law.  
Nevertheless, the law ‘to encourage’ VG development was rather weak (Feng, 2012). 
For instance, both the technical instructor in the Shanghai Station of Landscape 
Management and district SGC officials stated that the building developer/occupants 
usually did not have the intention to green their roofs. When the officials visited them in 
person and informed them of the new law as well as the governmental encouragement, 
their focus was on the direct benefits to the developer. Hence, the modest term 
‘encouragement’ created a second policy window.  
Phase 3: Reducing implementation barriers and the second policy-window 
For Li, the 2007 VG amendment was the first step of mandating VG in the law. To 
implementers, mandating is like an implementing order with the highest authority 
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(Hammond, 2013), which can reduce implementing difficulty. Li realized that only when 
the policy became feasible and acceptable to enough policy actors, would such a radical 
policy change become possible. In the following years, she committed to removing or 
reducing these barriers, with specific attention to establishing technical standards, funding, 
and acceptability. The upcoming big city event of World Expo 2010 Shanghai was a good 
opportunity to do so.  
Reframing the issue and turning the tide via the World Expo 2010 Shanghai 
        Howlett et al. (2009) argue that both political and economic factors are important 
determinants and can influence the timing and content of specific policy initiatives. The 
World Expo 2010 Shanghai was an important ‘political and economic event’ and Li’s 
social acuity enabled her to seize this opportunity. First was substantial VG-project-
development framing. To welcome the Expo, the municipality used all resources to retrofit 
and beautify the city. Meanwhile, in 2008, the Shanghai Greening Administration was 
again merged with the Shanghai Administration of City Appearance and Sanitation and 
renamed as ‘Shanghai Administration of Greening and City Appearance’ (SAGCA). 
Besides greening, the new authority’s purview expanded to city appearance and urban 
management. Expo-oriented city retrofitting became the top concern of SAGCA. Li 
proposed to vertically beautify the city by establishing greening on the roofs, the walls, the 
trellises, and the balconies. In the following three years (2008-2010), many VG projects 
were successfully completed. The second was the increased-public-awareness framing. To 
Li, more encouraging was that this Expo was a multinational showcase of building-
greening designs and technologies.  Almost half of the 289 pavilions were equipped with 
roof or wall greening (L. Li, 2010). Li recognized that such a high VG rate was a strong 
indicator: “We (SGC) want to let people know that VG is not the single-minded goal of the 
Shanghai authority, rather it has already become a worldwide trend, which is manifest in 
this Expo” (L. Li, 2010).  
SGC collaborated with the SAGCA-sponsored Garden magazine and published three 
special issues of ‘Expo Vertical Greening’ and a book entitled Pavilion Greenings of Expo 
2010 Shanghai, China, both with the focus on VG technologies. SGC also organized many 
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field trips and workshops in the Expo Park to inform governmental officials, professionals, 
and citizens about the eco-benefits as well as the aesthetic value of VG. Expo 2010 became 
a turning point in VG development in Shanghai (Sun & You, 2012). 
Post-Expo: reducing implementation barriers through institutional networking 
        Before the Expo, Li largely operated within the greening administration. The Expo 
mobilized almost every sector to collaborate and commit to the shared city goal. This 
suggested that there were more outside resources could be used and Li began to identify 
cross-sectoral resources through institutional networking.  
Establishing technical standards 
The first step was to make technical standards to improve the safety of VG projects. As 
shown in Table 1.1, the first two specifications were made right after the 2007 amendment, 
yet all others were made after the Expo. Although all these standards were initiated and 
established by SGC, they were usually co-issued by SAGCA and other related institutions. 
Alliances with other more powerful institutions imply not only the increased authority of 
these standards, which is conducive to compliance, but also promote roof acquisition for 
VG installation because the planning or housing agencies are responsible for the roof 
regulations. As more VG projects were implemented and inspected following these 
standards, the public and property owner/occupants’ worries about technical issues like 
leakage and safety decreased.  
 Table 1.1 Technical standards made under the direction of SGC 
Year Title Issued by 
2008 Technical Specifications for Roof Greening (Trial)  SGA 
2009 Technical Manual for Green Walls SGA, SSLM 
2014 Technical Specifications for Green Building Planting  SAGCA, SAPLR 
2015 
Technical Guide for the Viaduct Pier Greening 





Provisional Regulations for the Management of Viaduct 
Pier Greening Project 
SAGCA, STC 
2015 




Source: Compilation of Shanghai Vertical Greening Documents (SAGCA & Shanghai 
Station of Landscape Management, 2015) 
Note: SGA: Shanghai Greening Administration 
          STC: Shanghai Transportation Committee 
          SAPLR: Shanghai Administration of Planning and Land Resource 
          SCURC: Shanghai Committee of Urban-Rural Construction 
          SSLM: Shanghai Station of Landscape Management 
Issue promotion and public-support mobilization through media  
Li understood that both the media and the public were critical policy actors, and 
capitalized on the media resources to make the VG more acceptable to the public. Since 
most green roofs were not open to the public, Li made full-range ‘watching, listening, and 
touching’ plans to soften up the public. The mobilization work involved three types (Table 
1.2): online ranking for top VG projects in the city; persuading the SAGCA director to 
speak on the radio about VG; and organizing citizen field trips to VG projects. Li and her 
team members usually acted as an on-site interpreter. The pilot projects constructed in the 
early 2000s have been proven safe and cost-efficient, encouraging more development. For 
each event, the media were always invited and involved. For example, the large-scale 
‘Ranking for Shanghai’s Top 100 VG Projects’ in 2015 lasted for three months and most 
of the local media were invited for full coverage. These public participation activities 
familiarized citizens with VG and created a supportive atmosphere, which was beneficial 






 Table 1.2 Publicity for VG through media resources 
Year Publicity Media engaged 
2011 
-Rating top 10 VG projects in Shanghai through 
www. sina.com 





Garden magazine  






-March 12th ‘Arbor Day’ Propaganda of greenspace 
and VG 
2013 
-March 12th ‘Arbor Day’ Propaganda of greenspace 
and VG 
2014 
- ‘Cooling Summer’: to organize citizens for site-
visiting of VG projects  
-SAGCA head spoke on a radio program about VGs 
in Shanghai 
2015 
-Rating top 100 VG projects in Shanghai 
-To organize citizens for site-visiting of VG projects 
-March 12th ‘Citizen’s Greening Day’ Propaganda of 
greenspace and VG 
2016 
-March 12th ‘Citizen’s Greening Day’ Propaganda of 
greenspace and VG 
Source: authors compiled according to the local media coverage, SAGCA websites etc.  
To increase the VG area and reach out for funding  
To increase the VG area was the ultimate objective of the VG policies. Before the Expo, 
voluntary VG installation resulted in 98 ha of VG in the city. In 2011, Li proposed a total 
of 150 ha of VG in the municipal 12th Five-year Plan (2011-2015), which was assigned to 
each district’s annual plan. In 2014, another important city event, the Conference on 
Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) was held in Shanghai. To 
welcome CICA, Li added an extra 10 ha of VG to the annual plan of 2014 (H. M. Lu, 
20 
 
2016), which exceeded the targets of the 12th Five-year VG Plan, and boosted the 













Figure 1.1 Annual installation area of vertical greening in Shanghai during        
2011-2018* 
*Data sourced from Yearbook of Shanghai Greening and City Appearance. 
 
To advocate for a policy without any financial support is risky (Hammond, 2013). The 
annual plan can be made by the greening agency alone, yet to acquire funding entails cross-
agency negotiation. Given the fragmented bureaucracy in China, the greenspace funding 
involved institutions like the Shanghai Financial Bureau, Shanghai Commission of 
Development & Reform, Shanghai Administration of Planning and Land Resource, and the 
Shanghai Environmental Protection Bureau. After lengthy and difficult negotiations, in 
2012, the VG program was added to the municipal building energy-saving program (2012-
2015) with dedicated funding support. In these three years, about 28% of the new VG area 
was subsidized (SAGCA, 2017). The incentive varied between 50-200 Yuan/m2 according 
to the VG type, which was much higher than the 10 Yuan/m2 in the Jing`an’s pilot policy. 
Nevertheless, given the rising prices, this 50-200 Yuan subsidy covered only around 20-
30% of the construction costs. 
Li soon realized that this incentive policy’s size limit was too restrictive, requiring a 
minimum VG area of 1,000 m2. Given the small-scale and scattered nature of VG projects, 
the criteria greatly constrained the number of qualified projects. Also, 20-30% of 
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construction cost coverage was too low. So, in the second three-year (2016-2019) program, 
she appealed to the Shanghai Committee of Development & Reform (SCDR) to lower the 
size threshold and to increase per square meter funding, yet did not succeed. The SCDR 
responded that all other sectors’ funding criteria improve year by year, there was no reason 
to lower only the greening sector’s threshold.  
Second policy amendment: ‘mandating vertical greening’ in the law 
All of Li’s political, technical, and publicity efforts were focused on streamlining the 
VG policy implementation. As an implementer, she understood the challenge to each 
district for fulfilling those annual plans. Many of these problems arose from the interaction 
of a policy with the street-level institutional context, and implementers who are often 
required to respond even when resources are insufficient (Shonkoff, 2000). As one district 
SGC official claimed, ‘We often find insufficient authorities and powers when negotiating 
with building owners/developers’. Li determined that legislation would be the most 
efficient solution to these challenges and would greatly relieve the pressure on the district-
level SGC implementers. In 2014, Li again proposed the amendment of the Shanghai 
Greening Regulations (SAGCA, 2015). Given the hitherto elaborate preparations, Li was 
confident enough to propose two mandatory clauses: (1) all new public buildings in 
Shanghai no higher than 50 m must be greened and (2) cover at least 30% of roof area 
(SAGCA, 2015). However, in the legislative process, the ‘30%’ was removed and replaced 
by ‘the percentage is to be decided by the government’. The new amendment was put into 
effect on 1st October 2015. This compulsory stipulation of VGs on public buildings was 
novel in China and set an example for other cities (H. Li, 2015). For instance, Shenzhen, 
another Chinese metropolis, also amended its greening regulation by adding similar clauses 
in 2016.   
1.5 Discussion and conclusions 
Bakir and Jarvis (2017) have suggested contextualizing policy entrepreneurship by the 
interaction of various factors at multi-level contexts: structural, or the broader material and 
cultural contexts; institutional, i.e. both formal and informal rules; and agency levels, the 
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agent’s social position or multiple identities in the same agency. In the case of VG in 
Shanghai, we can better understand the entrepreneurial strategies and tactics from both the 
agency and political regime contexts.   
Looking from the agent or individual level, we found that Li was very skilled in using 
the entrepreneurial strategies presented in Mintrom and Norman’s (2009) four-element 
framework, where the element of ‘problem definition’ is replaced by the ‘issue promotion 
through media’.  (1) Li conducted policy experimentation in the Jing’an district, which 
paved the way for “encouraging VG” in the law. (2) Through the exhibition window of 
Expo 2010 Shanghai, she reframed the VG issue as a world trend and this ‘world trend’ 
enabled her to propose annual VG targets in the city-wide 12th Five-year plan. (3) Her 
social acuity also allowed her to reach out and to improve the authority and legitimacy of 
this VG initiative, by networking with horizontal administrations to issue the technical 
standards, or by persuading the upper-tier director-general of SAGCA to speak on the radio 
for VG. While as a horticultural expert, Li could have publicized the effort, she realized 
that the involvement of higher-rank officials would increase political authority for VG (He, 
2018). As to the fourth strategy of problem-definition in the Mintrom-Norman framework, 
the problem was already defined here, since the ‘problem’ is urban greenspace shortage 
manifested by the indicator of greenspace per capita.  
What we want to highlight is another strategy beyond this framework: (4) issue 
promotion through mass media. Successful policy change requires widespread support 
from the public (Wang, 2008). Exoteric issues that involve the redistribution of a city’s 
limited resources, like the college matriculation policy for migrant workers’ children, 
easily generate extensive public debates and automatically move onto the policy agenda 
(Zhou & Feng, 2014). Conversely, VG’s esoteric nature caused it to be overlooked by the 
government and almost invisible to the media and the general public.  
To better understand Li’s last strategy, it is necessary to take a broader perspective. 
Embedded in a Chinese centralized context, the implications of VG’s low-profile nature 
are twofold for a policy entrepreneur. On the one hand, a topic high on the central 
government’s agenda means top-town regulation may happen, which will save local 
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entrepreneurial efforts. For the severe urban flooding problem, which can cause 
tremendous direct loss, the central government implemented the nationwide Sponge City 
program to deal with it (Zhang, Li, & Wang, 2016). However, this is not the case for VG 
and the convenient door was closed. Li had to expand the issue and advance the policy 
agenda through her own efforts. Conversely, the centralized political regime still opened a 
window for her to capitalize on the media resources. The relationship between the Chinese 
government and the media is like supervisor-subordinate (Wang, 2008). This enabled Li to 
readily levy almost all the possible media resources, including TV, broadcast, website, and 
social media to make the VG issue exoteric and publicize the VG solution in a positive 
way.  
At the agency level, the identity overlap of entrepreneur-implementer has both 
advantages and disadvantages towards policy adoption. The advantage allowed Li to spot 
problems associated with implementation. Through frequent interactions, including routine 
quarterly meetings with the district SGC officials, Li received feedback directly from 
frontline implementers and used it while she advanced the policy agenda. Cairney (2018) 
argues that policy entrepreneurs usually have a solution ready to chase a problem. As an 
implementer, Li understood the policy problem and figured out the policy solution. As a 
result, Li’s entrepreneurial tactics were especially implementation-oriented, like 
establishing technical standards, ensuring funding, increasing public acceptance, and 
promoting annual plans. When she found that the installation costs of VGs were higher 
than ground-level installation, she pursued financial support, although was not successful 
in lowering qualification requirements for funding. Her efforts reduced implementation 
barriers and made the policy more acceptable to policymakers.  
The disadvantage lies with the discrepancy in perception of the policy-goal ambiguity 
between the policy implementer and policymaker. For policymakers, sufficient language 
ambiguity allows different stakeholders to interpret the same policy differently and is an 
inevitable part of the political process (Baier, March, & Saetren, 1986; Berman, 1978). 
Oftentimes ambiguity is a prerequisite for getting new policies passed at the legitimation 
stage, with problems that cannot be immediately addressed buried in an ambiguous text to 
wait for later solutions (Matland, 1995). However, implementers are pragmatic and action-
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oriented (Shonkoff, 2000). Goal ambiguity results in substantial misunderstanding and 
uncertainty and is often culpable for implementation failure (Matland, 1995). As an 
implementer, Li preferred clear and operational policy goals like a minimum of 30% 
greening coverage, which made implementation and monitoring easier. However, from a 
policymaker’s perspective, such a clear goal would be too risky. In this sense, identity as 
an implementer does not necessarily benefit policy adoption. This differs from Bakir’s 
(2009) finding that policy innovation becomes more possible when the policy entrepreneur 
has multiple identities in both domestic and international policy communities, and where 
s/he can coordinate ideas and discourse in those communities. In this research, different 
perceptions of policy goals between the policymakers and administrators were not able to 
be removed by the policy implementer. 
Nevertheless, a resolute and action-oriented implementer’s identity did not prevent Li 
from keeping a flexible mindset. Usually, policy entrepreneurs seek to reduce potential 
risks to decision-makers (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). In the last phase, with all the 
technical, financial, and mobilization preparations made, Li’s identity as a policy-
implementer allowed her to prescribe a 30% greening percentage, which was denied. An 
effective policy entrepreneur is flexible and ready to make compromises (He, 2018). Li 
was a senior official and knew when to step up and when to step back. The flexibility of an 
effective policy entrepreneur enables her to accept compromises to get the policy passed. 
This echoes Noordegraaf’s (2000) observation that public managers may not do what is 
“best”, but what is regarded as “appropriate”. We may still expect a third amendment in 
which the roof greening percentage would be added. However, now that the policy 
entrepreneur has retired, will such a policy change happen? 
Finally, we want to address the internal and external validity of this research. 
Flyvbjerg (2006) suggested that a single case study can provide valid research outcomes 
when the case in question is supposed to be sufficient and illustrative enough. Given our 
research work conducted and the data collected, we believe that Shanghai presents such a 
case. VG is too ‘trivial’ a topic to automatically attract the attention of interest groups, the 
public, or the media; in this sense, entrepreneurship as an internal driver does contribute to 
overall policy change though some compromises have to be made. Nevertheless, such an 
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effort works in the landscape greening sector involving less political and interest conflicts. 
For other sectors, like healthcare reform, with various political and vested interest 
stakeholders opposing policy change, it would be expected that other entrepreneurial 
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For-profit sustainability: The policy gaps and potential 
of a club-good approach to shopping mall roof garden 
development 
Hongmei Lu  
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Abstract 
Green space as a public good is usually provided by the government. However, in high-
density city centers, governments struggle to fulfill this responsibility given severe land-
use conflicts. The club-good approach emerges as a potential market solution to this 
problem. Club good is a subcategory of public goods that are provided by private or social 
organizations to club members, featuring excludability and nonrivalry. Drawing on insights 
from field investigations and interviews, this paper examines how better institutional 
response may facilitate club-good’s sustainable development exemplified by the nascent 
for-profit shopping mall roof garden (SMRG) development in Shanghai, China. SMRGs, 
established by developers to serve mainly the mall customers, are in nature club goods. 
This research finds that though the government appreciates SMRG’s positive externalities, 
existing public policies are insufficient to support SMRG’s sustainability because they fail 
to respond to SMRG’s positive externality and cross-sectoral nature, and cause financial, 
legitimacy, and oversight gaps. This paper argues that appropriate institutional response 
can better facilitate club-goods’ development by (1) optimizing policy design to internalize 
club-goods’ external benefits and helping developers recover production costs; (2) 
interdepartmental collaboration as a response to SMRG’s cross-sectoral nature to facilitate 
conducive policy making and implementation. 
Keywords: Club good; for-profit; SMRG; institutional response; sustainability 





As an important element in city life, urban green space becomes indispensable during a 
crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic; people want to seek recreation and solace in nearby 
parks when indoor recreational places become inaccessible (Kleinschroth & Kowarik, 
2020). Green space development and management are usually regarded as the 
responsibilities of governments (Azadi, Ho, Hafni, Zarafshani, & Witlox, 2011). In 
metropolises, these responsibilities become great challenges for governments given the 
severe land-resource shortage. New Public Management suggests that complex social 
problems like urban green space shortage can be addressed through public-private 
collaboration (Azadi et al., 2011; Pincetl, 2003). When the private sector is engaged in 
providing public goods, it may adopt a club-good approach (Prakash & Potoski, 2007), 
which is a market solution to public good provision. A club-good approach means, by 
securing private rights and restricting access, developers provide and manage the club 
goods by forming a club of user homogeneity (Warner, 2011). In contrast to public goods 
being accessible to everybody, access to club goods is usually limited to club members. 
Club goods are typically excludable and non-rival. Examples of club goods include private 
parks, toll roads, and cinemas (Turner, 2000; Warner, 2011). The advantages of a club 
good approach lie with the potential of being more effective, innovative, and spontaneous 
than government management and delivery. It can also relieve the government of 
implementation concerns (Prakash & Potoski, 2007). Although the club-good approach is 
efficient in matching club users’ interests with service delivery, it is criticized for its 
exclusiveness and small scale, and may not be sufficient to support a sustainable city in the 
long term (Warner, 2011). Webster and Lai (2003) question a club good approach for its 
democratic legitimacy as it always privileges property-owner and business interests.  
  In densely populated cities, green spaces are often squeezed out, given a low priority, 
and replaced by high-rises or other development. Residents then suffer an “urban penalty” 
by being surrounded by impervious surfaces. As a remedy, many cities have instituted 
policies and programs to increase green roofs, which are usually first encouraged on public 
buildings (Carter & Fowler, 2008). In recent years, shopping malls have become a new 
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source of green roof development. In Japan, roof gardens have been an indispensable 
component of department store retrofitting plans since the Taisho period (Moeran, 2013). 
Shopping Mall Roof Gardens (SMRGs) are established by mall developers to serve the 
mall customers or by rooftop renters to serve specific groups (members). SMRGs are in 
nature club goods, featuring both private ownership (excludable) and non-rivalrous use 
(before congestion). In Shanghai, under the effect of fierce market competition, some 
pioneering shopping malls started to establish roof gardens in the past decade.  
SMRGs as club goods have two important features: positive externality and cross-
sectoral nature. Although the developers establish SMRGs largely for the economic 
benefits, including increasing customer base and top-floor marketing (Carter & Fowler, 
2008), SMRGs have positive externalities including ecological and social benefits that are 
desired by both the government and the public. Usually covering thousands of square 
meters, SMRGs are oases in city centers with obvious ecological benefits, such as reducing 
urban flooding risks, mitigating air pollution, and increasing urban biodiversity (Carter & 
Fowler, 2008; Claus & Rousseau, 2012), and become an important component of the urban 
ecosystem. SMRGs also have prominent social benefits. Rahman, Ahmad, Mohammad, 
and Rosley (2015) suggest that 47% of customers like to visit SMRG when they visit the 
shopping mall. In Chinese urban neighborhoods, the limited public spaces are often 
insufficient to offer landscaping, children’s playgrounds, or other amenities (X. Lu, 2018). 
Communities without good access to ground-level gardens favor these SMRGs. In this 
sense, SMRGs could be regarded as a type of voluntary environmental program, where 
institutions could incentivize private companies to produce environmental goods beyond 
legal requirements (Prakash & Potoski, 2012).   
Meanwhile, although SMRGs are voluntary programs, they feature a cross-sectoral 
nature and are subject to regulations by different municipal agencies. For example, as 
elevated gardens, they are considered urban green spaces and are overseen by the greening 
department. Second, when established on the top of buildings, they have building safety 
concerns. Their construction design needs to be approved by the planning department. 
Third, as the SMRG is a component of the business place, they undergo routine inspections 
34 
 
from the fire department. 
Preliminary studies show that many SMRGs have a sustainability problem. Dempsey 
and Burton (2012) describe sustainable green spaces are those valued by users “who want 
to visit them again and again” (P13). In this research, SMRG’s sustainability refers to (1) 
the roof garden’s good status, including sufficient vegetation coverage, maintenance level, 
and persistent upkeep; (2) increasing numbers of developers motivated and willing to 
install roof gardens. Azadi et al. (2011) argue that green spaces’ sustainable provision is 
premised on three conditions: physical environment support, socio-political support, and 
financial support. Specifically, funding, management, oversight, evaluation, and 
appropriate partnerships contribute to green spaces’ long-term existence (Fors, Molin, 
Murphy, & van den Bosch, 2015).   
SMRGs make a good case that the private sector provides a source of innovation to solve 
problems of public goods provision and management (Webster & Lai, 2003). However, 
Warner (2011) also suggests that club goods are not just spontaneous responses to urban 
problems. They need legal and financial support from the government to sustain. For 
policymakers, a voluntary SMRG program has two main goals. One is to induce the private 
sector to produce good quality roof gardens (positive environmental externalities) and 
ensure their adherence to program obligations; the other is to attract more private actors to 
participate in the program. Exemplified by the SMRG development in Shanghai, this 
research identifies the policy gaps and explores how to improve institutional design for the 
sustainable development of club goods, which means more developers are motivated to 
install and maintain good-quality SMRGs. The paper is structured as follows. The next two 
sections are the literature review and methodology, followed by the gaps in the existing 
policies that constrain SMRG’s sustainable development and the negative impacts of an 
uncoordinated administrative system on SMRG’s development. The potential of an 




2.2 Literature review 
The private sector has increasingly joined the government to collaboratively provide 
green space as a public service (Fors et al., 2015). Some of these collaborative provisions 
adopt a club good approach. In New York City, given the heavy competition for land, the 
municipal government developed many incentive policies to encourage developers to 
provide Privately-Owned Public Space (POPS) for the public’s use, which becomes an 
important component of urban public spaces (Kayden, 2000). In a broad sense, POPSes are 
club goods when they are owned and managed by private developers and the access is 
somehow limited. Others may use a multiproduct approach, namely a mix of pure public 
goods and club goods (McNutt, 1999). Turner (2000) suggests that the national park is a 
good case of a multiproduct approach: it provides both public goods (wilderness 
conservation) and club goods (recreational activities) for visitors; he modeled the 
optimality conditions for the mixed public good provision by park managers. In California, 
private developers engaging in the state or national park management use the revenues 
from the developed recreational facilities or other fee items for the parks’ daily 
maintenance and management (Gilroy, Kenny, & Morris, 2013). When well organized, the 
private sector can use its resources and contribute to all aspects of green space 
development, including lobbying, funding, marketing, and labor input for club goods 
(Rosol, 2010).  
In a club-good approach, as in most public-private collaborations, potential interest 
conflict between the public and the private actors can create a great divergence between 
the two parties and cause the private sector’s noncompliance (Prakash & Potoski, 2007). 
The government wants to shape the service sector according to the interests of society as a 
whole, while the private sector is more attentive to a specific group’s interests. Of course, 
sometimes developers also want to create a green image through environment-friendly 
activities like installing non-profit green roofs (Miller, 2014). But the private actors’ 
interests in engagement are mostly economic benefits from service/good development and 
management (Azadi et al., 2011). Brunner (2011) finds that in Wisconsin, developers are 
willing to convert brownfields into green space given the potential profits due to site 
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location, as many brownfields are in urban areas and have good proximity to population 
centers, transportation, and other resources. The government’s interests in brownfield 
development include eliminating blight, removing eyesores, gentrifying neighborhoods, 
increasing employment and tax revenue, and controlling urban sprawl by attracting the 
commercial entities to urban cores (Wernstedt, Crooks, & Hersh, 2003). Prakash and 
Potoski (2007) find that to maximize self-interest, the private actors may practice free 
riding and shirking in collective action when a club approach is used in environmental 
governance. Given these interest conflicts, the government needs to design policy tools to 
guide the club-good provision towards a more sustainable direction. A club-good approach 
can fail if some regulatory or supporting policies are absent (Prakash & Potoski, 2007). 
Warner (2011) explores the club goods provision in the US, including urban amenity 
infrastructure and waste management, and suggests that club-good production is usually 
supported by the government in aspects of legal and administrative framework or finance 
provisions. 
The government also needs to intervene to optimize the club good’s provision when club 
goods have externalities. The existence of an externality implies that the goods’ costs and 
benefits are not fully internalized. Accordingly, governments may step in to regulate to 
minimize negative impacts like pollution, while incentivizing more production of goods 
with positive externalities (Prakash & Potoski, 2007). When the goods provision has 
negative externalities, governments may step in to regulate to minimize negative impacts 
like pollution or toxic release, The government may use regulations, standards, or sanctions 
to urge the private sector to ensure the quality services/good (Prakash & Potoski, 2007). 
The government can set standards to curb negative environmental externalities. Public 
regulations are fair because governments respond to public interests instead of private 
interests. Governments also have the capability to estimate the cost of externalities, design, 
and enforce regulations to urge companies to internalize the negative costs.  
For public/club goods with positive externalities, it is necessary to provide incentives to 
internalize the external benefits, which will attract more private investors. A club-good 
approach is in nature a public-private collaboration. Collaboration always needs to offer 
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private investors something of material, social, or normative value in order to meet 
investors’ interests or recover the costs (Verschuere, Brandsen, & Pestoff, 2012). In New 
York City, if a POPS is provided by private developers, government designed incentives 
can cover at least the costs incurred in providing the POPS. For example, the government 
could allow the developer to build a taller building by increasing the Floor Area Ratio 
(FAR). The private provision of one unit of POPS can acquire 2-14 units of bonus floor 
area (Kayden, 2000).  
Green roofs as club goods have many well-recognized positive externalities, as 
previously mentioned. Thus, this FAR policy is also a very popular tool in encouraging 
green roof establishment on private buildings (Carter & Fowler, 2008). In cities like 
Chicago or Portland, Oregon, the FAR bonus is a popular indirect financial incentive. In 
Chicago, the FAR bonus is decided based on the following formula (Carter & Fowler, 
2008, p. 7):  
Bonus FAR = (area of green roof over 50% of net roof area ÷ lot area)* 0.3 *Base FAR. 
The most prominent positive externalities from green roofs stem from stormwater 
management (Claus & Rousseau, 2012). In many countries, the stormwater tax is 
implemented by local governments as the main incentive of private building’s green roof 
establishment and upkeep, which produce stormwater tax credits (Miller, 2014). In other 
cases, given the potential restriction of applying public funds to private properties, the 
government may use alternative indirect financial policy tools like green building awards 
or honoring demonstration sites to increase the private sector’s returns (Carter & Fowler, 
2008). To support the service/goods sustainable provision, the private investor’s 
interests/costs need to be sufficiently presented and discussed at the beginning of 
collaboration (Chris Ansell & Gash, 2008).  
Green roof as a subcategory of green space has been extensively studied from 
technological, policy tool, or life-cycle analysis perspectives (Carter & Fowler, 2008; 
Claus & Rousseau, 2012). However, it has seldom been studied from a club-good 
production perspective. SMRG is still an untapped research topic that received very limited 
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academic attention. Moreover, to what extent a club-good approach can help governments 
optimally provide public goods remains a challenge (McNutt, 1999). This research will 
bridge the gap by exploring an enabling institutional environment to a club-good approach 
to the green space shortage problem in high-density cities. 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Study site 
Shanghai is one of the metropolises in China at the forefront of SMRG development. 
Shopping malls are often integrated into a city complex, which covers large lot areas (X. 
Lu, 2018). Shopping malls boomed along with the big city event of World EXPO 2010 
Shanghai, which brought great business opportunities to the city. As shown in Figure 2.1, 
since 2010, every year there were dozens of malls established in the city. Booming mall 
development intensified commercial competition. Meanwhile, online shopping threatened 
to substitute city center shopping (Miller, 2014). To survive, new shopping malls are 
designed to be one-stop city complexes by highlighting experience-economy development. 
In addition to traditional stores and services, roof gardens are integrated into mall 
development. Developers established SMRGs as a new tool to differentiate from their 
competitors and take a bigger market share (Miller, 2014). A roof garden’s perceivable 
benefits can motivate developers to voluntarily establish them, independent of policy 
initiatives or government incentives (Carter & Fowler, 2008). 
Given that SMRG remains a nascent industry, there is no specific official 
documentation or statistics on it. The author used the municipal statistics of annual vertical 
greening development datasets (including green roofs, green walls, and other forms of 
above-ground greenings) to identify the SMRGs and verified them with the responsible 




Figure 2.1 Total number of shopping malls in Shanghai (2009-2019) 
Note: Malls have business areas >30,000 m2, with few exceptions.  
Source: Shanghai Commerce Development Research Center, 2018 and Shanghai Council 
of Shopping Centers, 2019. 
2.3.2 Data collection 
 Data collection focused on the SMRG’s sustainability, policy gaps identified by 
administrators and developers, and the perceived policy solutions. Data were collected 
through document review, field investigation, semi-structured interviews, and online 
satisfaction evaluation from customers. The first step was to review official documents to 
understand shopping-mall development and existing green-roof policies in the city. Then 
online resources, especially the largest commercial customer feed-back sharing website 
www.dianping.com was heavily used to learn about the user experience of SMRGs. 
Field investigation and on-site interviews were conducted in the summers of 2016, 2017, 
and 2019. The author visited 40 SMRGs in all. To make the field investigation sampling 
representative, investigated SRMGs were selected according to the location, size, and age 
(Appendix Table 2.3). Different time slots were chosen including weekdays and weekends, 
daytime and night (sometimes after 22:00). Sustainability per se is a concept very difficult 
to precisely evaluate (Hueskes, Verhoest, & Block, 2017). The author, based on the 
municipal Green Roof Technological Guideline, used three basic indicators including 
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sufficient vegetation coverage (>60%), maintenance level (>80% plants in good shape), 
and persistent upkeep (>15 years) as a convenient reference to learn about the sustainability 
status of SMRGs. Forty-two SMRG developers, onsite managers & gardeners, and 28 
onsite visitors were interviewed. Of all the interviewees, developers and managers were 
usually identified and recommended by the mall receptionist upon request; gardeners and 
visitors were randomly met in the SMRGs. Interviews with six officials from the Shanghai 
Administration of Greening and City Appearance (SAGCA) (both city-level and district-
level) were arranged separately. Inquiries include SMRGs’ perceived challenges in the 
process of management and operation; the relevance of existing green roof policies to 
SMRGs and post-implementation monitors; the potential new policies to boost SMRG’s 
development; government’s and developer’s interests in SMRG. Data from different 
sources were triangulated to verify the validity. 
2.4 Results 
Of all the 295 malls developed during 2009-2019 in Shanghai, around 1/3 malls (101) 
have SMRGs. Among the 40 surveyed SMRGs, the average size reaches 4,913 m2, much 
larger than the non-mall roof gardens in the city (Table 2.1). In the surveyed SMRGs, 
22.5% are completely open free to mall customers; 77.5% have various for-profit activities 
located in the garden, with businesses ranging from youth equestrian club, garden center, 
urban farm, mini zoo, to garden café/bar. Those non-profit SMRGs or the toll-free areas of 
a for-profit SMRG partially serve as social spaces for public gatherings, especially when 
shopping malls become not just commercially driven venues but the center of city life 
(Miller, 2014). For instance, in the author’s field investigation, sometimes around 22:00, 
there were still nearby residents hanging out in the SMRG. In one field survey, a young 
couple commented: “Every weekend when we visit our parents who live nearby, we visit 
this garden too. We actually want to move back as there is no such a nice garden near our 
residence.” In this sense, these SMRGs complement the public green space shortage and 
serve as public goods. 
However, many SMRGs have sustainability concerns. According to the author’s 
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investigation, around 60% of gardens have problems like low vegetation cover, poor 
maintenance, or being abandoned in only a few years. These problems are also confirmed 
by online users’ feedback from Dianping.com, as well as interviewees from the greening 
department. For example, garden users’ complaints include the poor maintenance of 
gardens, unexpected closure, smell from the rooftop flue pipe, or elevators not going to the 
top floor. Kayden (2000) suggests that when the private developers innovate to engage in 
the public good provision, it becomes relevant to look at the role of the government and to 
detect the potential policy gaps in facilitating the goods’ quality and sustainability. 
Table 2.1 A summary of the 40 SMRGs investigated in Shanghai  
SMRGs Results Notes 
Location 
40% Inner ring; 47.5% 
Middle; 12.5% Outer ring 
Divided by three rings on the 
municipal map 
Year of construction 
10% prior 2010; 30% 2011-
2015; 57.5% 2016-2019 
 
Average size 4,913 m2  
Sustainability 40%   
For-profit activities in 
the SMRG 
77.5% 
Equestrian club, garden 
center, urban farm, mini zoo, 
café 
Accessibility 80% 
20% closed in the author’s 
field trip 
Evaluated by visitors 
(dianping.com) 
87.5%  
Source: by author 
2.4.1 Existing policies  
Various green-roof policies have been developed in Shanghai, ranging from regulation 
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to public education. However, all policies were designed for green roofs as public goods,  
facilitating the green roof's establishment but without taking the green roof’s business 
operation into consideration. Specifically, the two categories of regulation and incentives 
are most relevant to SMRGs (Table 2.2). For regulations, one is the 2015 Shanghai 
Greening Regulation, which stipulates a minimum of 30% of roof greening establishment 
on new public buildings. Here public building means both public ownership or public 
accessibility, including government buildings, schools, hospitals, and shopping malls. The 
other is the annual vertical greening (mainly green roofs & walls) development plan, 
requiring the city’s 16 districts to complete an overall construction plan of 400,000 m2/year, 
which increasingly becomes a tough task after one decade’s implementation as feasible 
roofs without an existing green roof decrease in the city.  
For incentives, one is the 2012 direct subsidy policy. Different types of green roofs are 
subsidized differently, ranging from 50 to 200 CNY /m2. According to the author’s 
interview investigation, this incentive covers about 20% of an SMRG’s construction cost. 
The other is the 2014 in-lieu policy. Any green-roof area not already receiving a subsidy, 
and in excess of the compulsory 30% roof greening, can be counted to offset a maximum 
of 15% of the required ground-level green space area. Developers can use the saved 
ground-level green space to increase the first-floor building area or parking lots, but 
according to the municipal planning regulation, the total FAR of the project will remain 
unchanged. Usually, the increased first-floor building or parking area varies between 
dozens or hundreds of square meters. According to some interviewees, compared with 
SMRG’s high construction cost, this incentive is rather modest. 
Table 2.2 Existing policies relevant to roof garden (RG) development 
 Policy tool Content 
1 2015 Regulation 
New public buildings must green 30% of the applicable rooftop 
area. 
2 Annual plan 








Intensive RG     
(garden-style) 
Semi-intensive RG      
(in-between) 
Extensive RG              
(lawn-style) 




The green roof area in excess of the required 30% can be used to 
offset a maximum of 15% of the required ground-level greening 
area. 
Type/Height of RG Conversion Coefficient 
Height (H) of 
green roof (m) 
1.5<H≤12 0.7 
12<H ≤24 0.5 





Source: author compiled according to government policy documents. 
2.4.2 Policy-caused gaps in SMRG’s sustainability 
Club goods with positive externalities are desired by both the public and governments. 
Existing policies to different degrees encourage SMRG’s establishment, yet they are not 
conducive to SMRG’s for-profit activities. In other words, current policies cannot monetize 
SMRG’s positive ecological, social, or recreational benefits, which implies they can barely 
help developers offset the payoffs (Prakash & Potoski, 2007). When the external benefits 
are not internalized, the developers are not able to recover the production costs and 
maintain the goods’ sustainability. Moreover, SMRG’s cross-sector nature entails 
interdepartmental collaboration to design and implement policies effectively. Yet, such 
collaboration is largely absent so far. Three policy-related gaps in terms of finance, 
legitimacy, and oversight are identified. 
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2.4.2.1 The financial gap  
Claus and Rousseau (2012) compared the green roofs’ costs and benefits based on a 
50-year life span to find that for private investors, the costs far exceed the benefits, when 
the public ecological benefits include improved air quality, increased biodiversity, and 
mitigated greenhouse gas emissions cannot be internalized. SMRGs, compared with other 
green roofs, are much larger, and both the construction and maintenance costs have to be 
paid by the private developers. Unfortunately, the direct governmental subsidy covers only 
around 20% of SMRG’s construction costs. SMRG managers also frequently mentioned 
the high maintenance expenditure including the irrigation cost in hot summer. The tiered 
water rates made the garden’s water bill a big burden for garden developers. Given these 
financial gaps, developers need to make ends meet by gaining revenues from garden-based 
for-profit activities. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in Shanghai, most ground-level 
public parks and gardens as public goods have been open to citizens for free since 2004, 
except for some specialized ones such as the botanical garden, zoo, or classic gardens 
(Jiang, 2005). The private developers could barely charge entrance fees for SMRGs 
because of this public park’s free-entrance policy. What can be charged are the added 
values based on the SMRG, like mall member’s kitchen gardens, horticultural DIY classes, 
or children’s nature education. The revenue from these horticultural businesses is relatively 
low. The more profitable businesses include garden cafés, garden restaurants, and youth 
equestrian clubs. The equestrian club is among the highest return-on-investment rooftop 
businesses; one equestrian class can be charged as high as 880 CNY (125 USD)/45 mins. 
In the 31 for-profit SMRGs, over 25% have introduced the youth equestrian business. 
Nevertheless, these businesses still have a legitimacy problem. 
2.4.2.2 The legitimacy gap  
Given SMRG’s cross-sector nature, a legitimacy problem arises in the process of 
garden business operation. For-profit SMRGs are relevant to several departments including 
the greening, urban planning, business, and fire department. As mentioned, the existing 
green roof policies do not support SMRG’s for-profit business, which influences SMRG’s 
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financial and management sustainability. As a nascent industry, SMRGs are not compatible 
with the existing urban planning regulatory system, especially the FAR policy. According 
to the planning regulation, SMRGs are not supposed to have any roofed structure, which 
should be counted in a building’s pre-approved FAR. Accordingly, structures like a tool 
shed, plastic arch shed, or gardener’s resting room will be tagged as “illegal construction”, 
which greatly impacts SMRGs’ physical supporting conditions. For example, seedlings 
may die, and the horticultural DIY classes have to be canceled in inclement weather. 
SMRGs are also related to the business department for the license issue. The business 
law stipulates that a business needs a physical address to be licensed, but the rooftop does 
not have an address. If the FAR policy allows SMRGs to have a roofed structure, and 
accordingly a formal address, then the garden businesses can apply for a license. As a 
result, though catering businesses like garden cafés or garden teahouses are popular with 
visitors, they become illegitimate when not licensed. According to one SMRG developer, 
“We have an informal 200 m2 indoor space, yet we cannot use this space to apply for a 
business license. Many visitors are interested in hosting company gatherings in our garden. 
Yet they hesitate as they need to pay the cost to a formal company.” While some gardens 
are operated as informal businesses, “We cannot advertise for our unlicensed garden café. 
We are afraid of whistleblowers. Should it be a legitimate business, I am sure the garden 
can self-sustain or even make a profit.” SMRG’s financial sustainability is thus greatly 
impacted. 
      The third department that influences SMRG’s sustainability is the fire department. The 
legitimacy problem further causes other management problems, including fire safety 
regulation. For this new industry, the fire department cannot apply the regular fire 
specification as SMRGs are not formally registered; but SMRGs, as a component of the 
mall, still undergo fire inspection. According to a garden manager, “It is a gray area, 
nobody says we are illegal, nobody says we are legal. We want to register our garden center 
at the Fire Department, but they do not accept our application. During important city 
events, the city’s fire inspector simply asks us to shut down to eliminate any potential safety 
risks.” Given these FAR-related legitimacy and management problems, some SMRGs and 
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businesses exist for only several years before the gardens are transferred to the next tenant 
or just abandoned. For instance, the Vanke Garden Center, which was established in 2017 
with 23 small flower shops established, as of 2019, only three shops survived.  
2.4.2.3 The oversight gap 
Due to the abovementioned financial and legitimacy gaps, some developers can avoid 
the ban, driving the oversight problem. Though SMRGs are club goods, they are not 
completely independent of government regulation or incentive. Most developers have 
applied for and received either the direct subsidy or the in-lieu incentive; meanwhile, they 
need to follow the 30%-green-roof regulation. In this regard, the government must monitor 
the policy implementation outcome and make sure all the incentivized or regulated SMRGs 
are well established and maintained. Generally, green roofs, compared with ground-level 
green spaces, are scattered and less accessible, which poses considerable oversight 
problems for the government with limited staff (Keeley et al., 2013).  
First, although around 1/3 developers volunteered to establish SMRGs, others may 
want to enjoy a green image without having to actually pay the costs of being 
environmentally responsible (Prakash & Potoski, 2007). SMRG’s cross-sectoral nature 
leaves loopholes in policy implementation. For instance, when negotiating the mall 
developing plan with the district government, some developers may ask to reduce the 
project’s 30% green roof establishment duty. Johns (2019) suggests that green 
infrastructure’s implementation is always influenced by political or economic 
considerations. Shopping malls, given their economic contribution and positive influences 
on communities’ life, are regarded as both an economic and political achievement for the 
located district (M. Li, 2017). District governments with relatively lower GDP tend to 
accept such a green-roof reduction request to attract the mall to locate in their district. A 
cross-departmental administrative system renders this compromise possible. For instance, 
the greening regulation may be compromised when it is made by the greening department 
but implemented by the planning department in the project approval process. A good 
example is the mall of Yuexing Global Port, one of the largest malls in Shanghai. Both the 
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municipal and district greening departments contacted the developer several times in the 
hope of establishing a high-quality demonstration SMRG to serve as a green role model 
for other malls. To their disappointment, the mall was finally completed with only a small 
green roof, even though it publicized in the media its 30,000 m2 SMRG. The greening 
officers were annoyed: “This mall project even fails to meet the ground-level greening 
requirement. We do not understand why this project is even approved when it does not 
meet the greening requirement. According to the in-lieu policy, they should construct more 
roof greening as compensation.” In other cases, in order to encourage the mall to locate in 
their district, the district’s high-level officers may ask the greening department to allocate 
some subsidy, even if the roof garden area is not big enough to qualify for a subsidy. When 
departments have incompatible interests and are not well coordinated, the SMRG may 
become a compromise instead of a necessity. 
Second, SMRG’s economic stringency directly leads to SMRGs’ degrading quality, 
which impacts the garden’s ecological and social benefit provision. Developers tried to 
minimize maintenance costs by decreasing the greening areas or using lots of plastic plants. 
In the Let’sCreateMore SMRG, almost 90% were plastic plants. In the Macalline SMRG, 
the on-site gardener complained: “The maintenance has been contracted out for many years 
at a low price of 10 CNY/m2/year (Note: at the district-level, the maintenance quota is 12.7 
CNY/m2/year). But this year, the manager plans to find a new maintenance company, as 
the present maintenance cost remains a heavy burden for the mall.” Another way of saving 
maintenance costs is to reduce opening hours or simply to close the garden when the 
operation costs exceed the benefits. Many gardens have much shorter opening times than 
the mall’s, such as 11:00-18:00. In the author’s field investigation, around 20% SMRGs 
were either temporarily closed or never open for public use. This is echoed by comments 
from the Dianping.com evaluation website; many customers complained about the 
unexpected closure of the SMRGs. Of course, SMRG’s opening or not is completely at the 
developer’s discretion. However, as a club good, when the SMRG is poorly maintained 
and even closed to visitors, the expected benefits of increasing the customer base cannot 
be realized.  
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Finally, when regulations are inconsistent with the developers’ interests, they may 
defend their interests by putting up an active and direct resistance or playing games with 
the system (Chris Ansell & Gash, 2008). This is the case in SMRG projects, where the 
developer’s noncompliance with the regulation or the FAR policy is not uncommon. For 
example, some developers actively invite equestrian clubs to locate in their SMRG, but 
part of the established roof greening is removed and replaced with either sand or plastic 
grass. Or, when the sheltering structure is not allowed, some developers find leeway to get 
around the ban. They use the caravan or a refurbished container for necessary indoor 
activities; such facilities are mobile and can function as an office but not allowed. Some 
developers constructed temporary shelters. Such non-compliance adds to the urban 
planning department’s inspection and oversight burden. 
2.5 Discussion 
The emergence of club goods represents a voluntary compensation of the under-supply 
equilibrium of the provision of a public good (McNutt, 1999). However, when both the 
policy design and implementation fail to sufficiently respond to the club good’s positive 
externality and cross-sectoral nature, the club goods become unsustainable. On the one 
hand, the policies are not able to internalize SMRG’s external benefits to recover the 
production costs. The identified policy gaps are closely interrelated with the SMRG’s 
financial stringency, which is exacerbated by the legitimacy gap. Both the financial and the 
legitimacy gaps further cause the noncompliance as well as the oversight gap, and 
undermined the quantity and quality of club goods. On the other hand, the departmentalism 
did not resonate with SMRG’s cross-sectoral nature. Thus, club-good-friendly policies 
have not formed yet and the policy implementation compromises the existing policy 
effectiveness. Christopher Ansell, Sørensen, and Torfing (2017) contend that in order to 
improve execution success, policies need to be designed in a way that “connects actors 
vertically and horizontally in a process of collaboration and joint deliberation” (P475). This 
section will discuss how an appropriate institutional response, including coordinated policy 
design and interdepartmental administration may address the above-identified gaps and 
improve club-goods’ sustainability.  
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2.5.1 Policy tool design to internalize club-good’s benefits 
When a club good’s revenue is insufficient to cover the costs, the government can 
design policies to monetize the good’s external benefits (Prakash & Potoski, 2007). For 
SMRGs, some benefits such as the energy-saving can be automatically internalized when 
the building’s energy bill decreases after green roof installation. However, other benefits 
like air quality improvement, stormwater management, or urban biodiversity cannot be 
easily evaluated and monetized (Claus & Rousseau, 2012). The stormwater tax and the 
FAR incentive are two popular policy tools that can reduce a green roof developer’s 
financial pressure.  
2.5.1.1 The stormwater tax to internalize the stormwater management benefit 
The effectiveness of a club approach depends on the government’s skillful policy 
design (Peters, 2010). Optimized policy design by adding a stormwater tax to the existing 
direct subsidy policy can ensure all club-good investors benefit from such a policy tool 
mix. For shopping malls, usually, the roof owner is not always the garden developer, and 
the SMRG may be taken over by different garden developers (Miller, 2014). The initial 
garden developer receives the one-lump-sum subsidy, but when the garden business is not 
promising, he may transfer the SMRG to the next developer or simply abandon it, and the 
successors receive nothing. The added stormwater tax can encourage the successors to 
maintain the SMRGs, too. So long as the SMRG is kept in good shape, its stormwater 
management function will benefit the developer through the stormwater tax rebate. In the 
long run, the saved stormwater tax would be very considerable (Carter & Fowler, 2008). 
Of course, these saved stormwater tax rebates can also be converted to a water quota bonus. 
As summer irrigation is a high maintenance cost, such a water quota bonus can relieve the 
SMRG developer’s water bill burden. The greening department has been in negotiation 
with the water department for identifying the potential of this policy. Of course, the 
stormwater tax rebates can only partially cover the SMRG maintenance costs. Other 
incentive policies like the FAR will indirectly help internalize the positive benefits. 
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2.5.1.2 The FAR bonus to legitimize club goods  
When the FAR becomes the key to solving SMRG’s legitimacy problem, the FAR 
policy may be revised to allow n% of the total garden area to be legally roofed for garden-
related use. In many countries, the FAR bonus is a widely-used indirect incentive for green 
roof development (Carter & Fowler, 2008; Kayden, 2000). Yet, for SMRGs as club goods, 
the FAR bonus allows developers to use the bonus roofed space to acquire the business 
license.  In Shanghai, there are a few cases of allowing the FAR bonus. For example, the 
2012 Macalline (Beicai) SMRG was approved for a 10% FAR, which allows the business 
to be legally licensed and to have a formal indoor space for operation. Compared with the 
direct subsidy, this policy enables developers to support the club goods’ development. 
According to one manager: “We prefer the FAR policy than the direct subsidy policy. The 
FAR policy is like allowing us fishing; while the subsidy policy is like giving us some 
fish.” The FAR bonus policy has the potential to turn both the government and the 
developer’s inputs into meaningful outputs. 
Legitimization indirectly allows developers to internalize SMRG’s ecological benefits 
and create other positive public values. For instance, the Yangpu District Sci. & Tech. 
Commission proposed to establish a Youth Education Center for Nature-Deficit Disorder 
in one SMRG by granting annual funding. But this proposal is so far not realized as the 
SMRG is not a formally registered organization. Once this legitimacy problem is solved, 
the SMRG as a club good can provide valuable social services, because youth nature-deficit 
disorder is a big social problem in cities (Beatley, 2010). Shopping malls are usually at the 
hub of transportation with good public accessibility (Brunner, 2011). The location 
advantage along with the provision of nature-related services will allow developers to 
explore an appropriate club model. For instance, rooftop equestrian clubs have become 
popular because parents do not have to spend hours on transportation to send the children 
to remote suburban sites for equestrian instruction. Customers are willing to go to the 
SMRG to enjoy nature-related activities with convenience. In this sense, the FAR policy 
allows developers to create a kind of for-profit sustainability. 
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2.5.1.3 The resultant benefits of reducing the oversight burden 
Kayden (2000) suggests that when the private sector is engaged in providing public 
goods, regulation is necessary to secure public service quality and operation. In a club-
good approach, Warner (2011) instead argues that the developer must maintain high-
quality services and infrastructure in order to internalize benefits to the club members; 
otherwise, fee collection or charging will become less possible. In this sense, when the 
SMRG business is legitimized and revenue increases, the developers will have improved 
financial capacity and motivation to adequately maintain an appealing roof garden to attract 
more customers, rather than to frequently close the garden to lower the maintenance costs. 
Prakash and Potoski (2007) contend that club goods with positive externalities tend to be 
underproduced and vice versa. In this research, if the SMRGs become profitable and well 
maintained, the positive ecological and social externalities will increase; meanwhile, more 
malls would like to follow suit, which implies that there will be more SMRGs established 
in the future.  
Such a desirable outcome will ultimately reduce the government’s quality oversight 
responsibility. For instance, one interviewed officer suggests that, from her viewpoint, 
government oversight is not even necessary as she believes “when developers are willing 
to construct a garden, that means they either love SMRGs or at least they perceive SMRGs 
positively. If finally, the garden is out of maintenance, it is very possibly because of the 
funding shortage. Then, financial or policy support instead of oversight is more needed by 
them.” Moreover, when SMRG’s FAR bonus is present, the government’s responsibility 
for overseeing illegal construction will be minimized too. As when the business has 
legitimate roofed spaces, developers need not take the risk by playing with the system and 
using caravans, containers, or other restricted structures for indoor activities. Other 
management problems like fire inspection will be automatically solved, too. Private 
businesses are thus directed towards sustainable development (Steurer, 2013). However, 
such a virtuous cycle is based on the premise of close interdepartmental collaboration 
towards effective policy design and implementation. 
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2.5.2 Collaborative administration to respond to SMRG’s cross-sectoral 
nature 
An enabling institutional environment entails not only to design policy tools that can 
solve the problems but to integrate the stakeholders to find sufficient common ground to 
advance the policy-making and implementation process (Christopher Ansell et al., 2017). 
This is especially important for club goods like SMRGs which suffer from a cross-sector 
nature. As is obvious, all the policies including the stormwater tax, the water quota policy, 
or the FAR bonus policy will require inter-departmental collaboration. Much like the 
public-private collaboration, where cross-sectoral interest conflict is not uncommon, cross-
departmental collaboration involves interest conflicts, too (Chris Ansell & Gash, 2008). A 
potential solution is to identify and represent all stakeholders’ interests in order to break 
administrative silos and boost voluntary participation in municipal governance 
opportunities (Fung, 2004). 
 The achievement of such interest representation requires the advocacy party’s efforts. 
In a multi-department policy network, not only leadership but also the interest priority and 
power relationships will influence the green policy adoption (Johns, 2019). The greening 
department has always been eager to promote more SMRGs, which is usually a small part 
of a huge mall development project and not necessarily the interests or political priority of 
other departments. Hence, the greening department must act as a knowledge broker to 
market the SMRG’s deep values, and to build alliances with new partners. Koppenjan 
(2015) suggests that advocates always need to frame an issue in a bigger framework and to 
represent the relevant party’s interests in collaborations. For the moment, green roof 
establishment is justified mainly as increasing recreational green space for citizens. That is 
not enough. For instance, to convince the water department to support the legislation of a 
stormwater tax, the greening department needs to explain SMRG’s benefits in stormwater 
runoff reduction and storm peak flow delay. In many countries, green roofs are encouraged 
mainly for the urban stormwater management function, which is especially important in 
populous urban centers (Carter & Fowler, 2008). In most Chinese cities, urban flooding is 
becoming an increasingly severe environmental problem. Thus, the green roof’s 
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stormwater management function, which has been largely downplayed, would be a good 
selling point to obtain the water department’s collaboration.  
In a similar vein, the greening department may advise or guide developers to fit SMRGs 
into the planning department’s agenda. According to some interviewees, the FAR bonus 
policy has been frequently proposed by the greening department but not supported by the 
planning department because the latter worries that the policy may ultimately lead to far 
more illegal construction and exacerbate the oversight problem, which, of course, is not 
necessarily the case as previously discussed. From the planning department’s perspective, 
they perceive that the bonus policy will bring only burdens rather than benefits to them. 
Such a negative perception may be compensated through a multi-product approach, which 
means SMRGs can produce both club-goods and pure public goods, shared by both club 
members and cities (McNutt, 1999). The club-good approach is usually criticized for 
preventing an equal distribution of the club goods by catering to only a specific group’s 
interests (Warner, 2011). A multi-product approach can compensate for this disadvantage. 
For instance, the planning department is now dedicated to a “15-minute living circle” 
community revitalization plan as part of the municipal urban planning (2016-2040), which 
means citizens can reach the basic living services and public spaces within a 15-minute 
walking distance (M. Li, 2017). Shopping malls as important hubs of city life are 
unquestionably included in this plan, yet the rooftop is always a forgotten space. SMRG’s 
multi-product clubs will be able to contribute to this community revitalization plan by 
making the SMRGs more user-friendly. Responding to SMRG users’ evaluations from the 
Dianping.com website, the improvement measures may include adding more amenities for 
children, extending the garden opening hours, better designing the rooftop flue pipes to 
minimize the greasy smell, arranging an elevator that can directly reach the garden, or 
organizing community activities like open-air movies. There are now several malls that 
established outdoor stairs to make the SMRG accessible beyond the mall business hours; 
other malls can be encouraged to do so, too. These adjustments will not only improve 
customer satisfaction and customer base but will also meet the planning department’s 




Urban green space provision in high-density metropolises is a big challenge for 
governments when land resources are in severe shortage. The club-good approach to 
producing SMRGs presents some potential. However, existing green roof policies, though 
benefiting SMRG’s establishment, are insufficient for their long-term sustainability as 
these policies fail to internalize the club good’s positive externalities and respond to their 
cross-sector nature. Without sufficient policy support, there are financial and legitimacy 
gaps, and the resultant club good’s degraded quality and developer’s noncompliance 
further cause an oversight gap for the government. Moreover, SMRG’s cross-sectoral 
nature requires multi-department collaborative administration in the policymaking and 
implementation process. For the moment, when the pioneering 1/3 malls have established 
roof gardens but are struggling with the sustainability problem, while other 2/3 malls have 
not taken action yet, it is important to provide a timely institutional response. Such 
responses include (1) optimized policy design to internalize SMRG’s external benefits in 
order to financially sustain and legalize the club goods, and ensure their quality to reduce 
oversight responsibility; (2) to build cross-departmental allies and boost voluntary 
participation in municipal governance opportunities through interest representation. Both 
contribute to a club-good enabling institutional environment. However, this research is 
constrained by the nascency of the SMRG industry and based on the authors’ single-city 
investigation. This recommends future research to explore the feasibility of a club-good 
approach to mitigating the urban green space shortage problem, and to conduct more 
empirical examinations of the importance of an enabling institutional environment for this 
for-profit sustainability initiative.   
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Unveiling the Quasi-Public-Private Partnership (QPPP): 
Evidence from China’s environmental service sector 
Hongmei Lu a, Audrey L. Mayer b, Shan Zhou a, and Adam M. Wellstead a  
a Department of Social Sciences, b College of Forest Resources and Environmental 
Science, Michigan Technological University, Houghton, MI, USA 
Article History: Received 16 Jan. 2020; Revised 28 Jun. 2020; Accepted: 
Abstract 
Originating in neoliberal democracies, the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a common 
policy tool allowing governments to provide public service through collaboration. In some 
non-liberal societies, PPPs may not squarely fit into the classic PPP category but rather 
take different forms, which we label as ‘Quasi-PPPs’ (QPPPs). QPPPs provide important 
functions especially in economies in transition, yet have received little academic attention. 
Here we propose a general definition of QPPPs as ‘partnerships between a government 
entity and a not-fully private entity’, and explore factors that influence the PPP-QPPP 
transition in non-liberal contexts, using the nascent Chinese eco-environmental service 
partnerships for a case analysis. Drawing on insights from a self-established dataset and 
interviews, we find that the PPP-QPPP transition involved two-steps: (1) the eco-
environmental service partnerships, initially established as PPPs, became inoperable with 
inexperienced partners and unsupportive markets; (2) with state bailout, the private partner 
became a subordinated partner in an ‘SOE-private consortium’, and PPPs transitioned to 
QPPPs. QPPPs brought about two outcomes: hidden debts for the government and the 
private sector’s nationalization. We conclude that in a non-liberal society, when three 
critical PPP assumptions, namely competent partners, supportive market, and horizontal 
structure, are violated, PPPs are more likely to transition to QPPPs.  
Keywords: PPP; Quasi-PPP; eco-environment service; China 






      Governments all over the world are using partnership arrangements to shift or share the 
costs and risks in providing public goods and services (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). 
One popular arrangement is the Public-Private Partnership (PPP). PPP is defined as a 
‘cooperation between public and private actors with a durable character in which actors 
develop mutual products and/or services and in which risk, costs, and benefits are shared.’ 
(Klijn & Teisman, 2003, p. 2). PPPs have well-recognized features including long-term 
contracts, private engagement, and major investments from the private sector (Hodge & 
Greve, 2007). New Public Management proponents have argued that PPPs increase 
governments’ problem-solving capacity, assuming that the private sector can provide cost-
efficient and reliable services for the same or better quality standards and price (Rakić & 
Rađenović, 2011). For instance, private partners may have the ability to maximize value 
for money and thus deliver outcomes at a lower cost through PPPs (Andrews & Entwistle, 
2010). 
      Besides PPPs, there are other extensively used yet less-noticed partnerships that do not 
squarely fall into the classic PPP category, which are labeled as Quasi-PPPs (QPPPs). 
QPPPs have emerged in service-provision sectors, i.e. health and medicine, education, and 
energy (Zapata & Hall, 2012), and often in countries with a dominant public sector, such 
as Russia (Nikitenko, Goosen, & Sablin, 2016), Poland (Tasan-Kok & Zaleczna, 2010), 
the Middle East (Burbury, 2017), and China. Nikitenko et al. (2016) defined QPPPs in 
terms of the proportion of public investment and the contract term. They note that Russian 
QPPP projects feature a high percentage of state investment, which can be over 50%, with 
shortened contract terms running less than three years on average. In Poland, QPPP 
initiatives refer to those project partnerships that do not fall under PPP as defined by the 
legislature but are partnerships in terms of organization and objectives (Tasan-Kok & 
Zaleczna, 2010). Zapata and Hall (2012) distinguished quasi-public versus quasi-private 
PPPs. Both are funded mainly by the public sector, but quasi-public are QPPPs 
characterized by high participation of actors from the private sector and civil society, while 




these cases is the use of ‘quasi’ to indicate a deviation in the characteristics of one of the 
partners or the partner relationship itself. These deviations may lead to distinctive 
outcomes. For example, in Russia, QPPP projects greatly outnumber PPP projects, and the 
prominence of QPPPs has essentially blocked PPP development; private investment 
accounts for only 0.89% of total Russian GDP (Nikitenko et al., 2016).  
Synthesizing across these limited studies, we propose a formal definition of QPPP as a 
partnership between a government entity and a not-fully private entity, characterized by 
one or more of the following features: shorter contract periods, predominant funding from 
the public sector, with costs and benefits not always equally shared between partners. The 
rarity of QPPPs in the literature may be due to their unique role in countries with centralized 
governments or a dominant public sector, particularly in communist or former communist 
states.  
In China, the concept of providing public services through partnerships began in the 
1980s and experienced three waves (Zhang, Gao, Feng, & Sun, 2015). Through the waves, 
the government’s main partners shifted from foreign investors in the 1990s to SOEs in the 
2000s, and domestic private enterprises in the third wave beginning in 2014 (Tan & Zhao, 
2019). Before 2014, partnerships developed at a negligible scale and were largely limited 
to the provision of infrastructure and utilities. Meanwhile, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
play substantial roles in these partnerships. Although in China most people use the term 
‘PPP’ referring to partnerships between the government and SOEs (Tan & Zhao, 2019; 
Xiong, Chen, Wang, & Zhu, 2019), others have questioned the nature of Chinese PPPs. 
For instance, Adams, Young, and Zhihong (2006) suggested that Chinese-style PPPs are 
qualitatively different, embedded in a system based on public ownership that alters the 
relationship between the public and private sectors. Some scholars use Public-Enterprise-
Partnerships (Zhang et al., 2015) or Public-Public-Partnerships (Braadbaart, Zhang, & 
Wang, 2009; Mu, De Jong, & Koppenjan, 2011) when referring to Chinese partnerships.  
Economically, Chinese partnerships were suboptimal as they did not provide services 
at a lowered cost (Mu et al., 2011). In the third-wave initiative, the central government 




the benefits associated with PPPs (Lavanchy, 2018, p. 11). The Chinese government 
encouraged the public sector to collaborate with ‘Enterprise Capitals’, which includes both 
state-owned and private enterprises (Tan & Zhao, 2019). This research will examine the 
eco-environmental service partnerships in the third-wave initiative, which as initially 
established between the government and private non-SOEs were real PPPs. These PPPs 
became infeasible and gradually transitioned into government ‘SOE-private-consortium’ 
partnerships, namely QPPPs. This paper will explore the factors that influence such a PPP-
QPPP transition. Given the challenges of establishing real PPPs in China, it is of great 
importance to understand why partnerships in China fail to develop into real PPPs, but 
instead, evolve into QPPPs. 
3.2 Features of Chinese QPPPs  
      Generally, a Chinese QPPP can be defined as a ‘partnership between a government and 
an SOE-involved not-fully private partner.’ In China, there lacks a clear demarcation 
between the public and private sectors (Zhang et al., 2015). The context for Chinese QPPP 
is characterized by several historic economic and political factors that benefit SOEs and 
corporatized public entities. This results in an over-dominance of SOEs and an 
underrepresented private sector, and often results in economic under-performance of the 
partnership’s programs and activities.  
      In Chinese QPPPs, SOEs often have governmental connections and monopolistic 
behaviors, and thus have inherent advantages when dealing with government-related 
business. SOEs may also have greater capacities in technology and management 
experience than private companies, and a more appropriate organizational size to handle 
large-scale municipal projects (Cheng, Ke, Lin, Yang, & Cai, 2016). Before the 1980s, 
almost all transportation projects were assigned to SOEs for design, construction, 
operation, and management (Mu et al., 2011). Moreover, SOEs have a more robust 
financing capacity, which is a key success factor for PPP investment in public 
infrastructure (Cheung, Chan, & Kajewski, 2012). PPPs often require higher financing 




governmental connections, they have a more favorable lending status with state-owned 
banks (Cheng et al., 2016). Wei and Wang (1997) found that even though roughly one-
third of SOEs were in substantial debt, few went bankrupt as state-owned banks provided 
generous loans to keep SOEs afloat. This reduces the risk of bankruptcies that would 
normally terminate PPP contracts.  
As in Russia, Chinese QPPPs are notable for reduced partnership opportunities for the 
private sector given the SOEs’ predominance. In a public-dominant society, the 
relationship between the public and private sectors is delicate. From the public side, some 
private companies’ opportunistic or deviant behaviors reduce their credibility and 
reliability, and increase risks to all partners. Mu et al. (2011) suggested that projects granted 
to private contractors were sometimes abandoned and eventually transferred to SOEs for 
completion, or otherwise did not meet expectations. Reliability issues and risk aversion for 
municipal infrastructure projects deter the government from future partnerships with the 
private sector. From the private side, the lack of a system for recognizable private property 
rights is not yet in place, and this lack increases the uncertainty of asset ownership in 
private companies. This uncertainly imposes a serious constraint on the willingness of 
private companies to be involved in partnerships (Adams et al., 2006). 
Finally, Chinese QPPPs typically demonstrate suboptimal economic performance 
when SOEs operate in a more bureaucratic and less-businesslike way despite (or partially 
because of) the above-mentioned intrinsic advantages benefiting SOEs. A PPP’s cost-
effectiveness is highly dependent upon the private sector’s businesslike operations 
(Cheung et al. (2012). In Chinese QPPPs, SOEs are the major partner. Their semi-
bureaucratic operating system is often overstaffed and values outputs such as social 
benefits over efficiency and profitability (Holz, 2002). Furthermore, QPPP project bidding 
may not always follow the best value-for-money principle. When SOEs are the 
government’s first-choice partner, projects with no real-risk transfer and limited (or no) 
life-cycle obligations tend to be awarded to local SOEs, not necessarily in a competitive 
procedure (Lavanchy, 2018). More critically, when SOEs have easy access to cheaper 




undermining the prioritization of economic performance. For these reasons, in the third-
wave initiative, the central government had strongly encouraged the private sector’s 
engagement to emphasize the desirability of economic efficiency (Lavanchy, 2018, p. 11). 
3.3 Methodology 
      The PPP concept is rooted in neo-liberal democracies and highly dependent on some 
context-specific assumptions (Linder, 1999). If critical assumptions are not satisfied, the 
probability of adverse consequences may increase, such as forced renegotiations of the 
contract, the bailout of the private sector, or termination of PPPs (Vecchi, Hellowell, Della 
Croce, & Gatti, 2017). Although a PPP’s viability relates to many legal, economic, 
technological factors (Cheung et al., 2012; Jamali, 2004; Zhang et al., 2015), we do not 
intend to enumerate these factors here. However, as QPPPs happen largely in non-liberal 
contexts, we focus on context-specific factors. Combining insights from an elaborated 
study of the literature and a preliminary study of the third-wave partnership practice, we 
suppose (1) the competent partners and (2) market support may directly relate to the 
viability of PPPs, and (3) the partner’s structure may influence the redirection of inoperable 
PPPs.  
3.3.1 Three context-specific assumptions of PPP 
      First, a viable PPP assumes the availability of competent partners, including a skilled 
government to package PPP projects and experienced and reliable private partners to 
execute projects (Ng, Wong, & Wong, 2010). The government’s capabilities may include 
maintaining a stable political and social environment, establishing a transparent and sound 
regulatory framework, or allocating and managing risk. The private partner’s capabilities 
include businesslike practices and thinking, the business acumen of profit-making, the 
ability to evaluate and avoid financial risk, and/or the ability to secure private capital 
(Jamali, 2004). A partner’s lack of experience may lead to many problems including cost 
overruns, revenue deficiency, and construction schedule delays, which can result in early 




      Second, a PPP’s viability entails effective market-based policy-tools to help private 
investors attain the necessary capital and revenue. Policy tools for capital acquisition in a 
developed market economy may include direct provision of debt and equity or capital 
credit-enhancement tools. Infrastructure PPPs usually have strong and long-term investors 
such as pension funds, life insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds (Gatti, 2014). 
These investors are attracted to the long maturities and stable returns associated with 
infrastructure-related financial securities. As for revenue, for PPP projects like 
transportation or utilities, the PPP investors are paid back by collecting tolls or utility fees 
from users. For non-revenue-generating services, including environmental services, 
policy-tool design to monetize the service becomes indispensable. In the US, urban 
stormwater-management PPP projects are funded through property taxes, in-lieu fees, and 
banking & offset programs (USEPA, 2015). For example, in Washington D.C., stormwater 
tradable credits are generated by flood-mitigation installations like rain gardens and green 
roofs that can be exchanged for development permits (The Nature Conservancy, 2016).  
      Third, a PPP also assumes a horizontal rather than hierarchical structure, with roughly 
equivalent power and authority sharing between the public and private entities. The 
equality of PPP partners lies in not only cost and risk sharing, but in service-delivery design 
and decision making, including veto power (Rakić & Rađenović, 2011). Inequality 
between partners can diminish the benefits of a PPP and alter the overall PPP development 
trajectory. Public-sector dominance can reduce the ability of the private actor to make cost-
efficient decisions, while the dominance of private sector interests diminishes the benefits 
to the state actor (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). The overdominance by private 
partners may also lead to privatization, which represents a shift of power and responsibility 
from public to private actors and an ownership transfer from the public towards the private 
sector (Linder, 1999). Some even argue that PPPs are equivalent to privatization, which 
‘reinforces the view that the government cannot be expected to perform well’ (Savas 
(2000). 




      Data on the central government’s post-2014 PPP initiative were acquired from the 
official database of China’s ‘Public-Enterprise-Capital Partnership Center’ under the 
Ministry of Finance (www.cpppc.org). This research centers on projects in the 
environmental services sector, which includes renewable energy, flood mitigation, air and 
water pollution mitigation, and ecosystem restoration. We focused on environmental 
service QPPPs for two reasons. First, while environmental protection QPPP projects 
accounted for only 0.5% of the total number of QPPP projects before 2013 (Cheng et al., 
2016), this sector became the third-largest category (9.82%) by 2014, following public 
utilities and transportation (Table 3.1), thus representing a rapid rise in the popularity of 
the sector. Second, compared with other sectors, environment-protection projects usually 
have a lower investment cost and have thus attracted more private engagement from small 
and medium-sized enterprises, offering a larger and more diverse pool of projects to 
examine (Lavanchy, 2018). Within this pool, we chose the subset of ‘ecosystem 
restoration’ or ‘eco-environment’ projects that were more tightly linked to urban green 
space construction and restoration to create a set of cases that would be comparable. 
Table 3.1 Categories of Chinese QPPP projects 
 Categories of PPPs Number of Projects Percentage 
1 Municipal engineering 3620 39.76% 
2 Transport 1291 14.18% 
3 Ecological/Environment protection 894 9.82% 
4 Town development 583 6.40% 
5 Education 430 4.72% 
6 Hydraulic construction 380 4.17% 
7 Tourism 319 3.50% 
8 Healthcare 263 2.89% 
9 Infrastructure 198 2.17% 




11 Guaranteed housing 154 1.69% 
12 Science and Technology 131 1.44% 
13 Energy 119 1.31% 
14 Sports 118 1.30% 
15 Eldercare 104 1.14% 
16 Agriculture 76 0.83% 
17 Forestry 57 0.63% 
18 Social security 35 0.38% 
19 Others 138 1.52% 
 Total 9,104 100% 
Source: Data from MOF Public-Enterprise Capital-Partnership database, as of Jul. 31, 
2019. 
Note: ‘Environment protection’ refers to the whole environment sector, including the 
subset of ‘Eco-environment’. 
      To start, we identified the major eco-environment private partners, most of which are 
listed companies. Non-listed companies represented a very small share of partnerships and 
thus were not the focus of our analysis. As the main partner, listed companies are required 
by law to release business and financial information, which makes partnership data easier 
to acquire. We used the Chinese stock trading software of ZhiyuanYihutong developed by 
the China Merchants Securities Co., Ltd., to collate the private companies listed under the 
section of ‘Landscape’ and ‘Eco-environment’ (26 listed companies in total as of May 
2019). To validate, we also examined the stock-exchange section of the professional 
landscape website www.yuanlin.com, which showed 30 listed landscape companies. These 
two sources were pooled to form a 45-company database, which includes both SOEs and 
private enterprises. We then looked at all the 45 companies’ official websites and annual 
reports since 2014 and identified 21 private, non-SOE companies with their main business 




      In data collection (Table 3.2), we focused on whether Chinese partnerships violated or 
met our three PPP assumptions; if one or more assumptions were violated, we determined 
how the violation of assumptions affected project or partnership outcomes. More 
descriptions about the evaluation of each assumption are presented in Appendix 2. To 
collect information for our assumptions, we used listed companies’ official websites and 
reports, financial market websites such as www.eastmoney.com, and governmental 
websites. We recorded the private company’s qualification-strengthening efforts including 
IPO and rebranding (merging and renaming) and the company’s financial situation 
(Assumption 1); market-based financial products (Assumption 2); and buyout/bailouts, and 
ownership of the original private (non-SOE) companies (Assumption 3). 
Table 3.2 PPP assumptions and evaluations 
Assumptions Partner competence  Market support Horizontal structure 
Evaluation 
-Conception/ 
expectation of PPP 
-Experience with PPP 
-Risk perception and 
aversion 
-Availability of market-
based policy tools to 
monetize eco-service 




-Independence of the 
private 
-Buyout/bailout 
Data to test the assumptions were not always available through second-hand data 
sources. For instance, detailed information on Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)’s business 
models was difficult to obtain. For some projects with perceived profits such as sewage 
treatment charges, there were only vague clauses in the contract. We then used snowball 
sampling to interview 12 key informants from seven listed companies, three unlisted 
companies that engaged or attempted to engage in partnerships, as well as two industry 
associations. Interview questions complemented and validated online information and 
filled the gaps in the secondary data. Our questions elicited information on all three 
assumptions, including the partner’s understanding of and experiences with PPPs; the 
availability of market-based policies and financing products; companies’ relationship with 
the local government and the challenges associated with the private identity; the company’s 




and the impact of such investment. The basis of our argument was formed from interview 
responses, the documentary evidence, and themes developed from coding.  
3.4 Eco-environment partnerships and the private partner 
3.4.1 Eco-environment partnerships 
      Rapid urbanization in recent decades has brought about substantial rural-to-urban 
population migration and boosted the real estate market, which has become a significant 
contributor to Chinese GDP growth (Fung, Jeng, & Liu, 2010). Up to 50-60% of local 
government revenue currently depends on two sources: (1) land conveyance fees from the 
gap between the lower cost of land acquisition from peasants and higher leasing prices to 
developers/enterprises; (2) taxes from enterprises and property marketing (Tao, Su, Liu, & 
Cao, 2010). The real-estate market has stimulated many industries, including landscape 
architecture, with about 90% of its business closely tied to the real estate industry. At the 
time of the third-wave initiative, over 16,000 landscape companies were established 
nationwide (Peng, 2016). Most of these companies were small- to medium-sized private 
firms, with fewer SOEs. Given the capital-intensive nature of landscape projects, larger 
companies entered the capital market via initial public offering (IPO) and became listed 
(Table 3.3). Among the eight early-listed companies, with the exception of two Special 
Treatment companies (Ecobeauty and Yunnan), the other six, Orient Landscape & 
Environment (OLE), Palm, Techand, Meichen, Mengcao, and Pubang, became pioneers in 
the third-wave competitions.  
      Urbanization has resulted in severe environmental problems along with skyrocketing 
housing prices. The central government regulated the real-estate market against speculation 
and simultaneously called for ‘Beautiful China’ development by emphasizing ecological 
and environmental protection. These paired policies placed local governments under 
financial pressure. Post-boom declines in the real-estate market shrank local revenue, while 
the Beautiful China initiative demanded expenditures on environmental protection 




wave PPP initiative was launched.  Local governments responded to the central initiative 
by organizing a myriad of training and field surveys, selecting pilot projects, and 
establishing a PPP center (Huo, 2014).  
This third-wave initiative has represented new opportunities for industries impacted by 
the real-estate market downturn, including the landscape industry. The ‘Beautiful China’ 
initiative involves many areas related to the landscape industry: theme park planning, water 
treatment, soil restoration, and large green infrastructure construction. It is noteworthy that 
most eco-environmental projects are not typically revenue-generating, and previous to the 
PPP initiative were completed using a short-term build-transfer approach. Now in the form 
of a partnership, the contract period includes 3-5 years of construction plus 10-30 years of 
operation/maintenance. Given that these projects have very limited revenue-generating 
potential during the operation/ maintenance stage, usually, the government pays both 
construction and maintenance costs for these partnership projects.  
The landscape companies envisioned these partnerships as an opportunity to break the 
state monopoly on public goods/services provision. For instance, OLE’s 2015 annual 
report stated that ‘PPP opens the door for the private companies to engage in public 
goods/services like water and park service, and broadens the development room of private 
companies’ (P10). The president of the Techand company stated his resolution in a 2017 
meeting: ‘(except for SOEs), private enterprises can also perform well in PPPs’. These 
companies, owned and controlled by domestic private individuals (non-SOE companies), 
became the main private partners in eco-environment partnerships.  
3.4.2 Private partner qualifications 
Given their previous underrepresentation in PPPs, landscape companies modified their 
credibility, financial capacity, and branding to position themselves as eligible partners. 
Credibility and financial capacity are two basic requirements for private partners. Cheng 
et al. (2016) suggested that local governments prefer private investors with sufficient 
competence and a higher degree of information disclosure as partners. Although SOEs are 




provided private enterprises room to develop in the environmental services sector. From 
the perspective of our interviewees, the level of transparency associated with listed 
companies is now regarded as a precondition for credibility by many governments. These 
public listings also allowed for companies to expand their financial capacity. Before 2014, 
there were only eight listed companies; during 2015-2017, 13 more became listed (Table 
3.3). Those already listed (except two special treatment companies) had substantial first-
come advantages.  
Branding is an equally important strategy for entering PPPs. The companies rebranded 
through merger and renaming to facilitate PPP-project bidding. For example, companies 
expanded their business from a narrow focus on landscaping design to services such as 
water treatment and waste disposal. Much of this adjustment was accomplished through an 
enterprise merger. Of the 21 listed landscape companies, 17 were involved in mergers and 
acquisitions and the largest companies expanded dramatically (Table 3.3). For instance, 
during 2015-2016, OLE merged with five environmental companies at the cost of fivefold 
of its net profits (Lei, 2018). Sixteen out of these 21 companies took on new names to 
appear more comprehensive and align with nationwide opportunities (Table 3.3). The term 
‘landscape’ was regarded as too narrow and was replaced by ‘ecology’ ‘environment’, or 
‘eco-environment’, and terms indicating the company’s locality were removed to appear 
more national. This process of mergers and rebranding helped the companies sign more 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.5 Applying PPP assumptions to eco-environment partnerships 
        Using our previously stated definitions and assumptions of PPPs and QPPPs, we 
examined Chinese eco-environmental partnerships between the government and the private 
listed companies. Here we determine whether these partnerships meet the three critical PPP 
assumptions and if not, how the violation of assumptions affects project and partnership 
outcomes.  
 Assumption 1: Competent partners  
        The partners’ experience or capability greatly influences their perception of PPP 
opportunities and evaluation of the associated risks, costs, and benefits (Jamali, 2004). The 
third-wave partnership initiative became very popular in less developed regions where 
there were more untapped infrastructure needs (Lavanchy, 2018). Accordingly, many local 
governments saw partnerships as a ‘mega credit card’ to alleviate local financial stringency 
(Hodge & Greve, 2007) and committed to developing more projects through partnerships. 
This is clear from the national PPP database. In hinterland provinces with lower GDP per 
capita, hundreds of PPP projects were initiated regardless of local financial circumstances. 
Moreover, local governments in these areas had few or no experiences with PPPs in terms 
of how to minimize risks and build capacities (Lavanchy, 2018) and often awarded PPP 
contracts to companies with name recognition, paying little attention to their economic 
situation. For example, a public planning agency in Sichuan province signed a Sponge City 
development project with OLE in July 2018, but by then OLE was already involved in a 
cash crisis. As a result, this signed project remains unexecuted to date, as shown in the 
database. Also, local governments still had a bureaucratic rather than a market mindset to 
problem-solving, reducing the potential for PPPs to generate benefits. For instance, in 
wastewater treatment and waste management sectors, the fee levels in long-term offtake 
agreements are regulated by local governments rather than based on a market-based 
formula (Lavanchy, 2018). 
        From the private side, despite the non-revenue-generating nature of most eco-




generated substantial cash-flow risks. The six leading companies each contracted dozens 
to hundreds of projects and took over the upfront costs to enable the projects to get started 
quickly (Lei, 2018). For instance, OLE contracted 113 eco-environment projects with a 
total investment reaching 169 billion CNY. As Table 3.4 shows, 97.6% of projects which 
specified an upfront-cost split between partners had a 70-100% private upfront expenditure 
of the total project investment. It is noteworthy that these projects’ aggregated upfront 
expenditure was already more than 10 times OLE’s market value. The large number of 
projects multiplied by each project’s high percentage of upfront cash investment can 
accumulate huge debts and overwhelm a private company. Public listing helped secure part 
of the cash flow, but the remaining had to be leveraged through market-based financing.  
Table 3.4 Upfront-cost split between the public and private of OLE’s QPPP projects 
Split of upfront expenditure 
No. of projects Percentage 
Private Public 










92.20% 7.80% 1 
90.50% 9.50% 1 
90.00% 10.00% 26 
85.00% 15.00% 1 
80.00% 20.00% 30 
76.70% 23.30% 1 
75.00% 25.0% 1 
70.00% 30.00% 17 
60.00% 40.00% 1 
2.4% 
51.00% 49.00% 1 
  82 100% 
Source: Data from OLE’s annual reports (2014-2018) 




progress and performance. The cash crisis was exemplified by the trendsetter OLE’s bond-
issue failure in May 2018, which caused stock-market panic for ‘eco-environmental PPPs’ 
(Lei, 2018). The stock price of many listed eco-environmental companies decreased by 
over 50% in 2018. OLE suffered the largest loss - its total stock-market value shrunk by 
60% in five months, approaching bankruptcy (Lei, 2018). Due to severe cash shortages, 
OLE suspended or postponed some of its contracted projects under construction, such as 
the Liuli Wetland in Beijing and the Zihe hydro-ecological project in Shandong province 
(Li, 2018). Our interviews revealed that many companies shared these experiences. These 
lengthy project delays led to inoperable and failed partnerships.  
Assumption 2: Market support 
        Market support implies the availability of market-based tools to minimize the private 
sector’s capital and revenue risks. Such tools include (1) policy tools to marketize non-
revenue-generating service value so that projects turn a profit, and (2) market-based 
financing tools such as loans to secure capital for the private partner. However, such tools 
are far from sufficient in the Chinese market. First, in eco-environmental services, only a 
few types of services like theme parks or rehabilitated brownfields for real estate or 
cultural-tourism sites can be revenue-generating, and the revenue rarely compensates for 
the private investors’ huge upfront expenditure (Wang, 2018). Accordingly, the private 
partner is put at remuneration risk and must depend upon the government for payback 
(through general revenues, for example), which adds to the government’s long-term 
burden. This is clear in the national database: among the 64 Sponge-City stormwater ‘PPP 
projects’, only one project is user-payment, while 36 projects (56%) are government-
payment and 27 are mixed payment (42%). In this sense, the partnership is simply an 
instrument for the local government to develop projects while extending the payback 
period from 3-5 years in the traditional built-transfer arrangement to 10-30 years in PPP 
arrangements. Such projects were regarded as ‘fake PPP projects’ and have been prohibited 
by the central government since 2018 (Lavanchy, 2018, p. 3). 




capital. Financing products such as credit-trading or banking and offset programs are rare 
in China (Wang, 2018) and project financing is also not the norm (Lavanchy, 2018). 
Moreover, the lending bias against private companies remained unchanged during this third 
wave, even though the central government issued many policies attempting to create an 
equitable environment for SOEs and private companies. Some large, state-owned banks 
provided lower rates, some even as low as 1.2% for 10-20 years, which were only available 
to 100% SOE-invested QPPP projects (Lavanchy, 2018). The private sector often had to 
borrow from commercial banks or shadow banking systems at higher interest rates. At the 
beginning of the third-wave initiative, some banks responded positively when the central 
government encouraged ‘environmental PPPs’ (Tan & Zhao, 2019) and developed 
financing products like carbon financing, pledged loans for forestry rights, and green eco-
environment funds. However, the cash crisis increased the market’s concern about eco-
environment projects’ return on investment and the bias grew to impact both the private 
sector and the ‘environmental PPPs’. The interest rate for these projects increased from 
roughly 6% in 2017 to 7.5% in 2018 (Li, 2018), and many of these projects became 
financially untenable.  
Assumption 3: Horizontal partnership structure 
        Although the eco-environmental partnerships became financially infeasible when 
violating assumptions 1 and 2, the violations did not directly lead to a QPPP transition. A 
PPP’s infeasibility is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the transition. It was not 
until the third assumption was violated as the government prevented the partnerships from 
failing or terminating, intervening by providing financial aid, which substantially 
redirected the partnerships’ trajectory into a QPPP. PPPs imply a horizontal collaborative 
structure between independent partners from the outset of a project (Brinkerhoff & 
Brinkerhoff, 2011). Initially, a horizontal structure was present for the Chinese eco-
environmental PPPs, given the listed companies’ nationally-recognized branding and 
competency. However, when the cash crisis happened and the state intervened, the private 




       To help the private sector tackle the cash crisis, SOEs, and other state-owned assets 
invested in the private sector by buying stock shares from the private listed companies. 
During 2018-2019, 11 out of 21 companies had acquired state financial investment (Table 
3.3). These formerly private companies became SOE-private joint enterprises, which 
changed the power and responsibility structure of the partnership. The eco-environment 
partnerships then evolved into QPPPs. While the cash shortfall was temporarily bridged, 
high-rank manager interviewees worried about the companies’ independence. Some of 
their specific concerns included the necessity to establish an in-house Communist Party 
branch, or caps on the chief executives’ income — generally undesirable changes in the 
private sector. More importantly, interviewees worried that state investment might force 
them to follow the SOEs’ semi-bureaucratic-management system, which provides less 
flexibility to adapt to the market.  
Increased state involvement not only transitioned these PPPs into QPPPs, but also led 
to ownership concerns and ‘nationalization’. For six out of the 11 companies with a state 
bailout, an SOE became the largest stakeholder and the ultimate controller (Table 3.3). One 
interviewee from the Palm put it simply: the future of the Chinese PPP market belongs to 
the SOEs. In essence, private companies best situated to engage in ‘eco-environmental 
PPPs’ were nationalized. While seeking support from the state, the private sector refrained 
from participating in partnerships since the costs of loss of company ownership outweighed 
the benefits of expanding into partnerships. In the 2018 annual reports, all companies 
highlighted their concern about PPP risks. Those companies with the most partnership 
contracts announced their strategic adjustment of shifting engagement from PPP to EPC 
(Engineering Procurement Construction), and in the future would only accept PPP projects 
with established payback mechanisms. YuanCheng stated it would limit PPP revenue to no 
more than 1/3 of the company’s total revenue. Indeed, an interviewee from Tianyu 
emphasized its lower debt ratio of 53.93% due to fewer ‘PPP projects’ contracted, and he 





3.6 Discussion and conclusions 
      PPPs originated and became popular in liberal market economies (Linder, 1999). 
However, their features and performance can be substantially transformed by the socio-
economic context (Table 3.5). In China, the central government attempted to achieve the 
benefits of genuine PPPs, and both the local government and the private sector responded 
actively by strengthening their qualifications to engage in PPPs. However, the initial PPPs 
ultimately transitioned to QPPPs when the private partners’ lack of experience and access 
to market support drove the PPPs to become SOE-private consortiums with a dominant 
public sector partner, and the desired PPP benefits failed to materialize.  
Table 3.5 Features of typical PPP versus Chinese QPPP 
 PPP QPPP 
Socioeconomic 
system 
Neoliberal market economy Socialist market economy 
Market tools to evaluate service 
Financing products to secure capital 
Insufficient tools to evaluate service 
Lending bias towards SOEs 
Partner/Partner 
equality 
Government and private 
Government and SOEs/private 
enterprises 
Yes The private is a subordinate actor 
Economic 
returns 
Vary across projects: optimum or not 
(1) Suboptimum. (2) Impose hidden 




Source: by authors. 
In a non-liberal economy, partners’ inexperience with PPPs likely leads to PPP’s 
infeasibility. China is more accustomed to in-house project development than PPPs (Mu et 
al., 2011), and both the public and private actors viewed PPPs as a panacea and had lofty 
expectations that were unlikely to materialize in the short run. For local governments, the 




estate regulations. Accordingly, they saw PPPs as an alternative to funding shortages and 
showed more interest in increasing investments than improving governance (Cheng et al., 
2016). For the private sector, the economic slump in the landscape industry encouraged 
private companies to hastily expand into eco-environment PPPs. Neither party had a sound 
understanding of PPPs or their risks. Furthermore, previous partnerships had been 
developed at a small-scale and were based largely on government-SOE partnerships. The 
limited experience gained in these earlier projects was insufficient to ensure the successful 
involvement of the private sector. PPPs entail skillful government involvement, including 
encouraging the private sector to introduce business-like practices into the public sector. 
However, local governments still employ bureaucratic power to intervene in the market to 
achieve preferred outcomes, which counteract these business practices and reduce the 
efficiency of service provision. More critically, partners should have complementary skills 
to accomplish a shared goal (Jamali, 2004), which was not evident in the eco-environment 
PPPs.  
Although financial difficulties in PPPs are not rare, the inability of the private partner 
to equitably access market support may be unique to the Chinese context. The environment 
sector became the third-largest category of service in PPP initiatives, but the market was 
far from ready to engage with this sector. In the previous two waves of partnerships, the 
services provided were public utilities or transport services with stable, guaranteed revenue 
streams. For non-revenue-generating PPPs in the third wave, when beneficiaries of 
environmental projects were not paying for these goods and services directly, market-based 
policy tools were needed to reduce profit uncertainties by placing a value on environmental 
services. The absence of such instruments not only increased the private sector’s revenue 
risk but also kept risk-averse financial institutions from incentivizing eco-environment 
PPPs. The slow development of an enabling financial environment was critiqued by private 
partners given the expanding environment-service partnerships (Li, 2018). Thus, PPP as a 
new ideology in China requires a free and fair market environment, which implies not only 
the availability of service-marketization tools but also a reduction of pro-SOE biases 
(Zhang et al., 2015). If the macro socioeconomic system remains unchanged, the 




partner, and scare off potential private partners.  
In a public-dominant context, the powerful government partner did not let PPPs directly 
fail, but tried to rescue them by forming a type of SOE-private consortium, which 
transitioned PPPs into QPPPs. In neo-liberal economies, PPPs imply a horizontal structure 
with some degree of partner equality as opposed to the domination of one partner over the 
other (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). Hence, when a PPP fails,  the government may 
take some remedial measures like the renegotiation of the contract or bailout (Vecchi et al., 
2017). In a Chinese context, the government acted as a ‘superpartner’ by directly 
intervening in the market to rescue the private sector. The government’s strong intervention 
turned the horizontal partnerships into hierarchical ones, undermining the private partner’s 
independence. Only when the private sector becomes a competitive partner, the 
government can reduce its involvement and treat commercial failures as risks borne by 
business entities, as intended by the PPP arrangement (Hodge & Greve, 2007). Otherwise, 
a poorly-performing private partner could conceivably under-perform a public sector 
counterpart. Wei and Wang (1997) suggested that once the private sector reaches a certain 
scale, the costs of maintaining a large and inefficient state sector will outweigh the benefits. 
If this occurs, we predict that QPPPs will become less popular than traditional PPPs.  
When PPPs revert to QPPPs, the widely-touted PPP benefits do not materialize. Rather, 
two unexpected outcomes occur: hidden debts for the government and nationalization of 
the private sector. When the cash crisis happened, the government became the payer of last 
resort. Although private companies originally invested in eco-environment PPPs, once 
PPPs became inoperable, their debts were taken over by SOEs. Cui (2019) found that SOE 
investments in the private sector are not limited to eco-environment companies, but have 
become a prevailing trend in all environmental service QPPPs. This echoes the general 
experience of Chinese QPPPs in many sectors. Tan and Zhao (2019) suggested that among 
the 572 national demonstration PPP projects, more than two-thirds are partnered with SOEs 
(and thus are probably QPPPs). Of the top ten PPP investors, eight remain SOEs 
(Lavanchy, 2018). When SOEs become the main investor, the government is then 




budget deficits and subsidy overruns. QPPP thus creates a new form of hidden debt in 
which ‘the government’s financial responsibility could easily be underestimated, 
threatening the financial sustainability of the government’ (Tan & Zhao, 2019, p. 4).  
In China, the private sector’s engagement in eco-environment QPPPs becomes 
nationalized through state intervention, contrary to concerns of privatization resulting from 
PPPs. This nationalization has driven the private industry’s waning interest in new PPPs. 
It took only five years for the private sector to turn from enthusiastically embracing PPP to 
cautiously shifting towards EPC schemes. When an enabling institutional environment 
remained absent (Zhang et al., 2015), PPPs proved a poor fit for non-revenue-generating 
sectors like eco-environment. For PPPs to extend into non-traditional areas with equally 
complicated valuation like education, health, or social care, it is inevitable that many 
smaller private enterprises will get involved. This points to the need for a more supportive 
institutional environment to foster the private sector’s competence and independence.   
       To conclude, China’s third-wave partnerships, though sought to be ‘real PPPs’, 
became inoperable when partners were inexperienced and the market was less supportive; 
with state intervention, the private companies became subordinated partners in SOE-
private consortiums. PPPs thus transitioned to QPPPs with high degrees of public control. 
Instead of sharing the government’s financial debts, QPPPs have become saddled with 
tremendous hidden debt, which revolves back to local governments. As this research is 
limited to the eco-environment service, we recommend a more comprehensive analysis of 
QPPPs in other service sectors as well as in other countries. Of special interest is how the 
new private-SOEs consortium influences QPPP projects, including potentially reducing the 
lending bias and financing cost compared with the solely private partner.  
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Appendix   
Descriptions about the evaluation of the three assumptions 
Assumption 1. Partners’ competence 
• Understanding/expectation of PPP:  
-The purpose of PPP adoption  
• Experience with PPP 
- Have partners ever engaged in PPP before?  
- How do the partners respond to the central QPPP initiative?  
• Risk perception and aversion 
-Understanding of partner’s financial affordability 
-The payback mechanism of QPPP projects  
 
Assumption 2. Market support 
• Market-based policy tools to monetize eco-service 
-How is the project investment paid back? Sewerage fee, park entrance fee? 
• Financial products in the market 
-What kind of financial products are available?  
-How high is the interest rate? 
-Do private companies have equal access to these financial products as SOEs? 
 
Assumption 3. A horizontal structure 
• Independence of private companies 
-Can the private shareholders make the decisions by themselves? 





-State/SOE’s investments in the private company 
-Is the investment a one-time bailout or a long-term plan?  
• Ownership  








How does policy goal ambiguity influence policy 
outcomes? Sponge-City Program implementation in old 
neighborhoods 
Hongmei Lu  
Department of Social Sciences, Michigan Technological University, Houghton, MI, USA 
Abstract 
When a central program is implemented in a top-down manner, the possibility for 
layered policy goals increases. A lack of coherence among these goals can cause policy 
goal ambiguity. This research examines how policy goal ambiguity influences policy 
implementation outcomes, exemplified by the Chinese Sponge City Program (SCP) 
implementation. SCP is a centrally initiated program, which requires using largely green 
instead of gray infrastructure to manage stormwater and implies two goals of sustainability 
and stormwater management. The municipal government of Zhenjiang (a Sponge City pilot 
program) layered a local goal of resident satisfaction. The sustainability goal has no clear 
measurement indicators, but the other two have. Drawing on data from in-depth interviews 
and field observations, this research finds that when the incoherent goals are not specified 
a priority, implementers prioritize the stormwater management and resident satisfaction 
goal, which put the sustainability goal in an inferior position. When the sustainability goal 
has only vague descriptions, implementers downsize green infrastructure, yet still regard 
the program as sustainable. This research concludes that in a multiple-policy-goal program, 
the goal priority ambiguity leaves implementers the discretion to decide the order of goals 
to manage interest conflicts; the goal measurement ambiguity allows implementers to 
decide the degree of their commitment to and interpret the performance of a goal. Such 
ambiguity-caused discretions may drastically divert some specific policy goals.    
Keywords: multiple policy goals; goal incoherence; priority ambiguity; measurement 
ambiguity; Sponge City Program 





4.1 Introduction  
When a policy is implemented top-down, from the supranational to the national level, 
or from the central to the local level, there could be multiple goals layered. Policy goal 
layering involves grafting new policy goals onto an otherwise stable institutional 
framework (Thelen, 2009), and may cause policy goal incoherence. Policy incoherence 
implies conflicts between the multiple goals or objectives (Wellstead & Howlett, 2017), 
and can result in policy goal ambiguity. Chun and Rainey (2005) have conceptualized 
policy goal ambiguity in four aspects: goal mission comprehension ambiguity, directive 
ambiguity, priority ambiguity, and evaluation ambiguity. Goal priority ambiguity, or the 
level of interpretive leeway in deciding on priorities among multiple goals, will arise if the 
hierarchical order is not specified by policy actors (Chun & Rainey, 2005). Goal evaluation 
ambiguity refers to the level of interpretive leeway that a policy or program allows in 
measuring the progress toward the achievement of the goal.  
Urban stormwater management has become a severe environmental problem with rapid 
urbanization and climate change (Uittenbroek, Janssen-Jansen, & Runhaar, 2016). Urban 
stormwater management will need to shift from traditional gray infrastructure to a green 
infrastructure (GI) approach because of the substantial economic, environmental, and 
ecological benefits that GI provides (Johns, 2019). SCP is such a program initiated by the 
Chinese central government in 2014, advocating to manage urban stormwater through GI 
approaches and to reduce the dependence on traditional large-scale gray infrastructure 
systems (Ma, Wang, & Ding, 2018). SCP includes two goals. One is sustainability, which 
implies the use of low impact and green strategies to manage stormwater. The other is 
successful stormwater management, in terms of flooding and pollution control. SCP is 
assumed to greatly benefit residents when implemented in urban and old town centers 
where both green space and flood mitigation are desperately needed (H. Li, Ding, Ren, Li, 
& Wang, 2017). When SCP was implemented in the pilot city of Zhenjiang, a local goal of 
resident satisfaction was layered onto the central goal of sustainable stormwater 
management by the local government tasked with implementing SCP. The frontline 




requirements. This research will specifically focus on goal priority ambiguity and 
evaluation ambiguity and determine how they influence the policy implementation 
outcome, exemplified by the Chinese Sponge City Program (SCP) implementation in the 
pilot city of Zhenjiang. 
According to the national SCP Guide, 80% of a city’s built-up area should meet the 
sponge criteria by 2030 (MHURD, 2014). As an indispensable part of the built-up area, old 
residential neighborhoods usually suffer most from flooding damages (G. Li, 2017). 
Zhenjiang’s old-neighborhood-based implementation will provide empirical evidence for 
sustainable stormwater management when SCP is implemented in compact cities. The next 
two sections are the literature review on policy goal ambiguity, and a brief description of 
the city and methods, followed by the results of how in a multi-goal program, the 
sustainability goal is undermined and the performance becomes hard to measure. The next 
section presents the mechanism of such impacts. This paper ends with a brief conclusion 
and suggestions for a myriad of other cities that are struggling in a stormwater management 
paradigm shift.    
4.2 Policy goal priority ambiguity and measurement ambiguity 
Policy ambiguity can be found in many aspects, such as the definition of policy goals, 
actor roles, or funding approach. Policy goal ambiguity is defined as a goal or set of goals 
that allows leeway for interpretation (Chun & Rainey, 2005). Such ambiguity can be caused 
by missing or inadequate information, inconsistency, and incoherence (Wellstead & 
Howlett, 2017). Goals are regarded as coherent when they are logically related to the same 
overall policy aims and can be achieved simultaneously without any significant trade-offs 
(Kern & Howlett, 2009). They are incoherent if they are contradictory and if goals can only 
be partially attained. Policy goal incoherence brings about the goal ambiguity concern, 
which is regarded as having many serious consequences (Chun & Rainey, 2005). For 
frontline implementers, they always have to coordinate among competing forces and 
achieve these goals as much as possible. Meanwhile, they must make decisions about 




Goal priority ambiguity has been given less research attention (Conner et al., 2016). 
Priority ambiguity refers to the degree of uncertainty in indicating priorities among 
multiple goals. Priority ambiguity means it is not clear which goals should take precedence 
over others during a specific period or there is no determined goal hierarchy (Chun & 
Rainey, 2005). The goal with higher priority on the implementation agenda will more likely 
be pursued; a higher priority goal need not conflict with a lower priority goal (Conner et 
al., 2016). Goal priority can help moderate goal conflicts or goal incoherence with regard 
to coordinating the intention-decision relationship (Conner et al., 2016). For instance, Gao 
(2009) finds that in a hierarchical policy implementation system, usually the central 
government will present and prioritize their policy objectives, which are used to direct local 
policy implementation. This approach can ensure that the policy goals set at the central 
level are achieved at the local level. Competing interests may influence goal priority 
ambiguity, as politicians need to at least partly address the demands of all stakeholders in 
order to encourage every affected party (Chun & Rainey, 2005). However, the juxtaposed 
goals without any hierarchical arrangement and prioritization leaves much room for 
interpretation for which goals should take precedence. Jung (2014) finds that priority 
ambiguity actually decreases the public servant’s job satisfaction when many equally 
important tasks have to be completed, which decreases their work efficiency. Chun and 
Rainey (2005) found that the need for political compromise, age of the agency, or the 
financial publicness are positively related to the agency’s goal priority ambiguity.  
Compared with goal priority ambiguity, the goal’s evaluation ambiguity has caught 
more attention in the goal-ambiguity literature. Evaluative goal ambiguity refers to the 
level of interpretive leeway in evaluating the progress toward goal achievement (Chun & 
Rainey, 2005). Policy goal clarity and clear performance measurements provide good 
guidance for goal achievement. That means the policy goal needs to be translated into 
performance indicators or indexes, in order to evaluate the policy outcome (Conner et al., 
2016). Different policies can have different degrees of clarity regarding evaluation criteria 
or objective performance indicators. Instrumental criteria or indicators are not always 
available in government public goods/service provision or policy implementation (Chun & 




allow very little space for interpretive leeway. Though Gao (2009) suggests that when the 
public service performance is measured simply by numbers, some substantial aspects such 
as governance improvement or social and political tensions can be neglected. Other policies 
descriptively present performance measurements and give much space for interpretation in 
evaluating whether the performance measurements are satisfied. Furthermore, Liu, Tang, 
Zhan, and Lo (2018) suggest that policy measurement ambiguity in the form of confusing 
goal standards is one of the main sources of divergence between central policy goals and 
local interpretations. Researchers have argued that given the difficulty in articulating and 
measuring goals, public servants have attempted to measure performance by looking at 
surrogates such as inputs, processes, workloads, and outputs, rather than objective 
outcomes and impacts (Chun & Rainey, 2005).  
Policy goal ambiguity is usually studied as a concept or a phenomenon from 
perspectives such as justifying the goal ambiguity, identifying the source and consequences 
of goal ambiguity (Thelen, 2009; Wellstead & Howlett, 2017), or how to conceptualize 
goal ambiguity (Chun & Rainey, 2005). This paper contributes to the literature by unveiling 
how goal ambiguity influences the policy implementation outcome.  
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 SCP in the pilot city of Zhenjiang  
Zhenjiang is one of 16 cities in the first pilot group to experiment with SCP. Each pilot 
city was allocated a minimum of 1,200-million-CNY as seed money and was given two 
directives: to raise matching funds through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and to 
combine SCP with old neighborhood retrofit efforts. Zhenjiang’s SCP covers a total pilot 
zone of 22.5 km2 with 80% of the zone located in the old downtown district that contains 
both old residential areas and non-residential areas. Zhenjiang is the only pilot city that 
developed SCP projects mainly in old downtown areas with substantial public engagement. 
This research focuses on SCP implementation in old neighborhoods in which about 




High-level goals are always expressed in the form of a mission statement and must be 
translated into directives and guidelines for practical actions, especially for frontline 
implementers (Chun & Rainey, 2005). SCP envisions a city to operate like a sponge to 
absorb, store, and infiltrate through GI measures (H. Li et al., 2017). SCP is a green policy 
patterned after the American Low Impact Development (LID) approach, as suggested by 
the title of the national Technological Guide of Sponge City Construction: Establishing 
LID Rainwater System (Trial) (MHURD, 2014) (“Guide”). LID, a term sometimes used 
interchangeably with GI, refers to managing stormwater at the source with decentralized 
small-scale green measures like rain gardens, green roofs, and permeable pavements, to 
increase site infiltration and reduce dependence on engineering structures and decrease 
infrastructure construction costs. While SCP’s overarching goal is sustainable stormwater 
management, it is divided into two goals. The first goal is “sustainability”, which implies 
to use low impact and green strategies for SCP, and therefore more green infrastructure 
than gray infrastructure is used. However, no explicit performance measurements are 
specified for this goal. In the 2018 Evaluation Criteria of the Sponge City national report, 
the measurements concerning sustainability are vague and descriptive, with no specific 
quantifiable indexes. The second goal is stormwater management, which has clear 
technical indexes of 70% runoff control and 60% pollution control (Table 4.1). Moreover, 
Zhenjiang specifically added a 30-year recurrence flood-control standard to this 
stormwater management goal.   
Green stormwater management programs usually need to address the flooding problem 
and also other problems like social well-being, local economy, and ecosystem health 
(Uittenbroek et al., 2016). SCP is a nationwide high-profile program, and therefore 
Zhenjiang as a pilot city is under the spotlight. When SCP’s target population involves 
hundreds of thousands of residents in old neighborhoods, there are perceivable challenges 
for SCP’s implementation. The old neighborhoods, like those in most cities in China, have 
various problems including outdated infrastructures, budget shortfalls, and poor 
management associated with residents’ informal land use. Thus, the city proposed an 
informal local goal of “resident’s satisfaction” (BHURD, 2018). Labeling it as “informal” 




goal frequently appeared in meetings and media coverage and actually became an implicit 
guideline in SCP implementation. To successfully complete this program, the city also 
established a three-tier decision-making and implementation network including an ad hoc 
SCP Office (Appendix Table 4.4). Many SCP public education activities through 
municipal TV/ newspaper publicity, posters, and flyers were carried out around the city. A 
WeChat SCP knowledge platform was developed, too. The Office partnered with each 
neighborhood’s Commission to interact with and respond to residents, including answering 
the 12345-complaint hotline. The number of complaint calls is a practical index to evaluate 
whether SCP’s performance is satisfactory to residents.  








70% of runoff control 
60% of pollution control 
City-
level 
Program SCP + neighborhood retrofit 






75% of runoff control  




                  30-year recurrence-interval flood control 
Source: author’s compilation based on government documents.  
4.3.2 Data collection  
Data collection centered on five aspects: SCP’s goal coherence, goal priority, goal 
measurement, challenges in policy implementation, and implementation outcomes. Data, 




resident’s satisfaction) and policy outcome (acceptance by residents, infrastructure projects 
pass central government inspection) were first acquired through second-hand sources 
including official documents and mainstream media coverage. However, most of these 
official or mainstream-media sources largely describe the general results of SCP 
implementation, such as how the SCP has mitigated the city’s waterlogging risk and how 
citizens are satisfied with the program implementation. Therefore, an in-depth interactive 
interview approach was used to gain detailed information, including insider knowledge 
(Uittenbroek et al., 2016) and internal documents. 
The lead author took a field trip to Zhenjiang in Aug. 2019, four months after the SCP’s 
central inspection and acceptance, and visited twelve SCP project sites including nine 
residential neighborhoods and three non-residential demonstration projects. Through 
snowball sampling, interviews were conducted with eighteen officials (mainly officers 
from the SCP Office and some GI officers outside the SCP Office) and professionals, 
including SCP experts both inside and outside of Zhenjiang (Appendix 2). Some re-
interviews were conducted by telephone during Feb.-Mar. 2020. Interview questions 
inquired about: conflicts between goals (goal coherence); indications about which goal 
should be prioritized (goal priority); the main challenges of developing SCP in old 
neighborhoods (implementation process); and the outcomes (what are central 
inspectorate’s comments about Zhenjiang’s SCP; residents’ response to SCP). In the field 
trips to nine old residential neighborhoods, over twenty neighborhood residents and three 
maintenance staff were interviewed. Questions included their perception of SCP, the 
influence of the SCP on their life, their satisfaction with SCP implementation, and their 
communication and interaction with the SCP implementers. All interviews were recorded 
and transcribed. 
4.4 Results   
Sustainable city development for both human and other eco-environment functions is 
challenging (Johns, 2019). Zhenjiang’s SCP was combined with old neighborhood retrofit 




only to handle the flooding problems but also the non-flooding problems. In the “SCP + 
retrofit” program, the three goals of sustainability, stormwater management, and resident’s 
satisfaction were found not always coherent. For instance, sustainability implies installing 
many GI projects in neighborhoods, which requires more land and competes with residents’ 
demands for more parking lots. The resident’s flood-free expectation will require more 
gray infrastructure in old neighborhoods and contradicts the sustainability goal. The 
neighborhood retrofit improved resident’s satisfaction yet entailed resources channeled 
from SCP, which undermined the sustainability goal, too. The three juxtaposed goals also 
have a priority ambiguity, namely, there is no explicit statement about which one should 
take precedence over others. As to goal measurement, both the stormwater management 
and resident’s satisfaction can be measured, but not the SCP’s sustainability goal. 
Implementers tried to attain these goals by following the available performance 
measurements.  
4.4.1 The goal of stormwater management  
In a multi-goal program, when no goal priority is specified, to act according to the clear 
numeric indexes is a safe and easy way for implementers to complete tasks. The city-level 
stormwater management goal has three measurement indicators. The first two of 75% 
runoff control and 60% pollution control were consistent with the central SCP guideline 
and straightforward. Many high-density neighborhoods in Zhenjiang were built in the 
1980s with water and sewerage infrastructure that quickly became outdated and undersized 
and often failed to cope with the intensity of precipitation events made worse by climate 
change (She, 2019). The SCP Office, made up of mainly water experts, collaborated with 
both domestic and foreign experts, and developed many hydraulic models to meet the three 
parameters. Some local experts had initially suggested to prioritize green over gray 
infrastructure, but their recommendations were not adopted (Jiang, 2017). One SCP 
planner argued: “We have thought about prioritizing green over gray in residential 
neighborhoods, but there the sewer infrastructure per capita remains low. To give up gray 
and depend on the green to achieve urban stormwater management is not realistic. So, we 




including sewage treatment plants, rainwater pumping station construction, and water-
quality monitoring stations were developed. GIs including rain gardens or bioswales were 
also used, however, compared with gray projects, the green ones were rather small-scale.  
What is controversial is the third stormwater management measurement indicator of a 
30-year flood-control standard, which is intended more to meet the resident’s satisfaction. 
SCP was initiated in direct response to the focal event of the devastating Beijing 61-year-
recurrence flood in 2012 (H. Li et al., 2017). Thus, an implicit objective of SCP as expected 
by both the public and media is to handle the extreme flooding. People will not easily 
accept that SCP is not able to solve the extreme precipitation events in typhoon seasons. 
Such expectation puts implementers in a decision dilemma. As water professionals, they 
know that GIs can mitigate only the first inch (20-30 mm/24 hours) of rainfall (Wise, 2008), 
and the limited green spaces could barely satisfy flood-free expectations. As public 
servants, they must handle the public’s complaints and expectations (Gao, 2009). Finally, 
implementers chose to meet the local goal by increasing Zhenjiang’s flood-control standard 
to 219 mm/24 hours (or a once-in-30 years event standard). One interviewee from the 
Zhenjiang Planning & Design Institute explained: “This index is very contentious, as 
usually SCP is supposed to handle light to moderate rain. We increased the recurrence 
standard because we want to make sure the residents will not suffer from flooding in the 
following 30 years.” Achieving this 30-year standard in old neighborhoods requires extra 
high-volume underground gray infrastructure, which makes the program much grayer than 
green in old neighborhoods. 
To meet all the three stormwater indicators, gray infrastructures substantially surpassed 
GIs in both the number of projects and the percentage of budgets. As shown in Table 4.2, 
GIs accounted for about one-third of the total SCP investment with the three bolded items 












1 Central subsidy for pilot SCP of Zhenjiang 1,200.00 
(1)  LID measures 731.52  
(2)  Ecological restoration and hydraulic engineering 283.48  
 
-Ecological restoration of the rainbow river  26.00  
-Dongwei area hydraulic engineering 30.00  
-Zhenrunzhou wetland eco-system construction 115.00  
-Smart Sponge system construction 30.00  
-Zhenrunzhou headwater quality guarantee project 82.48  
(3)  Pipe and network project 42.00  
(4)  Standard-reaching project of waterlogging  143.00  
2  PPP SPV investment 1,385.00 
(1)  Sewage treatment plant 230.00  
(2)  Rainwater pumping station construction 164.00  
 
-Rainwater pumping station construction in Yangzi River, 
Yuqiao village 
75.00  
-Rainwater pumping station construction at Three-ferry, South 
to Yangze River 
86.00  
-Retrofit of Six-ferry pumping station 3.00  
(3)  








4.4.2 The goal of resident satisfaction  
Street-level officers are responsible not only for providing public services but to deal 
with public complaints in their jurisdictions (Gao, 2009). For SCP implementers, when 
resident’s satisfaction became a local goal, they tried to meet their needs as well as gain 
their compliance.  
4.4.2.1 Sources of resident’s dissatisfaction 
Client dissatisfaction can be caused by interest conflict or insufficient knowledge about 
the policy. For instance, Ryan, Fábos, and Allan (2006) find that when implementing 
regional greenways on private lands, it requires coordination with private landowners, as 
they worry about the loss of privacy, liability, illegal parking, or noise. For SCP, although 
the stormwater management goal had been attained, unfortunately, this goal did not 
necessarily align with all resident’s interests. For instance, some first-floor residents did 
not see the immediate benefits of the new rain gardens and gradually turned them into 
private kitchen gardens again. Others complained about the shrubs in the rain garden 
affecting their window daylighting. Furthermore, initial support from residents for SCP 
projects decayed over time as the noise and inconvenience of construction impacted their 
lives or eliminated space for their outdoor exercise. Some extreme behaviors emerged, 
including unrooting plants or using boiled water to kill some plants in the night.  
Neighborhood’s perception of policy together with their learning capacity also decides 
the degree of their satisfaction. SCP, aiming for green-gray transition, is new to most 
residents (Dai, van Rijswick, Driessen, & Keessen, 2018). Keeley et al. (2013) find that 
the community oftentimes has a weak understanding of the stormwater problem and much 
of the public believes that rainwater is “clean” and is not a problem. Although many SCP 
public education activities were carried out, they are usually literal or dogmatic, and not 
necessarily understood by residents. Some residents paid far more attention to very 
localized outcomes while ignoring SCP’s overall green goals. Old residents have a deep 
sense of belonging to the neighborhoods in which they have lived for decades; any change 




included a new steel bench that was too hot to sit on in summer, messy-looking green 
spaces, and the slow replacement of mailboxes. Some disliked the yellow color of the 
flowers and admired other neighborhood’s cherry blossom’s red color, which is a symbol 
of happiness in traditional Chinese culture. However, in the field investigation, none of the 
residents discussed stormwater management through a green or a gray approach. 
Implementers had to spend much time communicating with the residents to reduce 
vandalism and increase compliance before the projects could resume. 
4.4.2.2 Improving satisfaction through “SCP + retrofit” 
Old neighborhoods have many non-flooding problems, such as roof leakage, low 
building energy-efficiency, insufficient amenities, and poor property management (She, 
2019). The maintenance budgets depend upon each household’s property management fee, 
but the collection rate is very low in old neighborhoods, especially when on average 52.6% 
of residents are retired and live on pensions (Gu et al., 2019). Given these realities, SCP is 
a great opportunity to improve the residential environment. As shown in Table 4.2, the 
expanded SCP included gas-line retrofits, building energy efficiency, as well as aesthetic 
upgrades such as building stuccoing and corridor lighting. In the aggregate, only three out 
of all the eight categories related to flooding mitigation.  
“SCP + retrofit”, being a free service provided by the government, generated increasing 
retrofit demands from residents. It is noteworthy that such an expanded program requires 
more expenditure than simply SCP development. Though Zhenjiang used a PPP to raise 
funding for SCP, the financial gap remained large. Accordingly, the Office had selected 
the 45 most qualified old neighborhoods out of hundreds for SCP development, based on 
six criteria, including suffering from flooding, and poor facilities and landscaping. Such a 
selective strategy brought about the service distribution impartiality issue. Many non-
selected neighborhoods noticed neighborhood betterment from SCP implementation and 
approached the Office for retrofits too. “Some residents used all kinds of networking, 
others visited the office of the Neighborhood Commission three times a day, to petition for 




Gradually, some unlisted neighborhoods were also added to the SCP. As a result, the SCP 
expanded substantially in both project purview and number, which made “SCP + retrofit” 
almost not a stormwater management program.  
Table 4.3 “Sponge + Neighborhood Retrofit” plan of Zhenjiang’s SCP 
Sponge+ 
Improve livability 
• Increase recreational spaces 
• Preserve big trees 
• Landscape reclamation 
Flood Mitigation 
• Route impervious surface into rain gardens and 
green spaces 
• Change sidewalks to permeable pavement 
Better Property 
Management 
• Re-organize property management  
• Establish maintenance guidance 
Retrofit Gas lines • Switch from coal gas to natural gas 
Upgrade Water-
Supply Infrastructure 
• Repair leaking pipes and meters 
• Replace eroded pipes 
Increase Parking 
• Increase parking spaces 
• Install porous parking lots 
Energy Conservation 
• Utilize thermal insulation materials 
• Install window shading 
• Upgrade electrical system and lighting 
Sewer Separation 
• Disconnect illegal connections 
• Separate sewer from storm drains 
 Note: Projects that can contribute to flood mitigation are bolded. Source: (She, 2019).  
Most public policies aim to align client behavior for compliance with government aims 
(Howlett, 2018). In this sense, the “SCP + retrofit” was successful by improving the 
resident’s satisfaction rate. According to one officer, “During a three-year period, our 
12345-hotline received over 1,000 complaint calls. While many complainers repeatedly 
called, it is estimated that there are about several hundred complainers, which is not a bad 
result.” According to a public post-implementation poll, citizen’s satisfaction rate reached 




that their property’s value increased by 5%-10% after SCP. Accordingly, more residents 
became willing to pay the property-management fee (Zhai, 2017). 
4.4.2.3 Concerns about diverting from the sustainability goal 
SCP’s sustainability goal is obviously to use a green approach to manage stormwater 
(H. Li et al., 2017). Nevertheless, “SCP + retrofit” gradually diverted from this primary 
focus when resources were channeled towards non-flooding related projects. For one, gray 
infrastructure projects accounted for about two-thirds of the total funding, with the 
remaining one-third left to be shared among GIs and neighborhood retrofit projects. 
Moreover, when a project involved both gray and green infrastructure, the gray projects 
were usually prioritized in both construction schedules and budgets. According to one 
interviewee, in the first-year audit, some expenditures on shingle roof retrofits were not 
accepted as SCP expenditures because they used shingles that did nothing to mitigate 
flooding. Although the final audit for Zhenjiang’s SCP has not yet occurred, the 
interviewed officers expressed anxiety about how to explain these expenditures to central 
auditors. For the other, the “Sponge + Retrofit” program required more inter-departmental 
coordination, necessitating hundreds of meetings between the sectors including planning, 
housing, electricity, energy, water, transportation, environment, in order to solve the 
surfaced problems. One frontline implementer commented that “So many tasks are 
packaged into an ‘SCP + retrofit’ program. We have to solve problems from roof leakage 
to septic overflow. Much of the work is not within the purview of SCP at all.” 
4.4.3 The goal of sustainability without measurements 
Although both the stormwater management goal and the resident satisfaction goal are 
well attained, they say little about the sustainability goal. On the one hand, the conflicts 
between green space and other land use that residents desire are always a big concern in 
GI installation (Dhakal & Chevalier, 2016). In Zhenjiang, implementers removed some 
unmaintained green spaces to mitigate these conflicts. In old neighborhoods, parking space 
shortage is a severe problem. Accordingly, in neighborhoods where 80% of residents gave 




were converted to pervious parking spaces. Increasing parking spaces was an effective way 
to improve residents’ satisfaction, as it developed a new, stable revenue stream for 
neighborhoods and improved the neighborhoods’ management. For example, in the old 
SaoMaoGong neighborhood (35,000 m2), the retrofits added 8,000 m2 of pervious parking 
space with some parking lots built on previous green spaces. The new parking lots were 
leased out and the revenue was used to invest in neighborhood management, turning the 
open neighborhood into a gated one. Residents were more satisfied with the tidy and safer 
neighborhood, even though the green space diminished. In interviews, some residents 
commented: “Previously the neighborhood green spaces were so poorly managed. In such 
cases, we prefer not to keep these ugly spaces.” Replacing some green space with parking 
lots became popular in other pilot projects, with some exceptions. ChaoYangMen, an old 
neighborhood largely occupied by teachers, retired officers, and relatively higher-income 
professionals, refused this approach and the green spaces were kept intact.  
On the other hand, implementers also decided to give up some potential green measures 
because they worried about GI’s long-term maintenance. For SCP, the central grants were 
earmarked for SCP construction but not maintenance (H. Li et al., 2017), and old 
neighborhoods do not have sufficient budget for maintenance. Without financial support 
or neighborhood buy-in, this maintenance is not likely to occur. Given insufficient funding 
for GI maintenance, implementers chose projects that would endure, instead of contributing 
to SCP’s green stormwater-management goal. For example, for the roof leakage problem 
in the retrofit program, implementers prioritized the shingled roof to solve the roof-leakage 
problem for residents, as green roofs require more frequent maintenance. In interviews, 
implementers expressed concerns about future maintenance: “We know the green roof is 
better for SCP. But it still bears the risks of plant root penetration and roof leakage and 
entails frequent maintenance. Moreover, we do not know who will take this responsibility 
and where does the maintenance budget come from?” Thus, in SanMaoGong, 12,000 m2 
flat roofs were retrofitted into shingled roofs, while only 700 m2 became green roofs. 
Another low-maintenance example involves rain barrels. The original plan was to install 
2,000 barrels, but ultimately only 500 were installed. According to one officer, they 




them), and the maintenance would be regarded as future trouble, too. Although many of 
such changes may seem small individually, in aggregate they may drastically reshape the 
strategic policy intention (Lipsky, 2010). 
To sum up, SCP in old neighborhoods, with substantial gray infrastructures installed, 
met all stormwater-management objectives, and achieved a high resident-satisfaction rate, 
but not necessarily in a sustainable or green approach. To hit the central goal, many GI 
projects including parks, water bodies, and wetlands were added to non-residential areas 
within and outside the pilot zone (Sima, 2018). These projects met the SCP goals of 
mitigating flood risk through GIs, though these areas were far from the impervious surfaces 
in the old residential districts.  
Zhenjiang’s SCP passed the central inspection in 2019. As commented by one local 
officer, “All the stormwater management indexes are met. Zhenjiang does have a lot of 
green measures in SCP.” Another officer mentioned that “When there are no specific 
indexes like the percentage of green roofs, the central inspectorate can only roughly 
evaluate how ‘green’ the pilot program is.” According to two central inspectors, “SCP 
remains a pilot program. When it is impossible to set clear indicators for the sustainability 
goal, we try to encourage pilot cities to do better and adopt more green measures. But no 
pilot city ‘fails to pass’ the final inspection”.  
4.5 Discussion  
The incoherence among multiple goals increased goal ambiguity, which is manifest in 
both priority ambiguity and measurement ambiguity. Such ambiguities bring implementers 
substantial challenges, but also leave them discretion to handle these challenges. At the 
central level, the tenet of SCP was a paradigm shift from green to gray in stormwater 
management (H. Li et al., 2017). However, the efforts towards the paradigm shift were 
undermined in a multiple-goal implementation. As a result, while both the stormwater 
management goal and the resident satisfaction goals were met, the sustainability goal was 
substantially compromised. Goal priority ambiguity and goal measurement ambiguity, 




implementation trajectory and outcome. 
4.5.1 Goal priority ambiguity  
Implementers tried to manage goal conflicts, they exercised discretion in deciding 
whose interests or which goal took precedence when not all can be met simultaneously. 
When they prioritized the resident satisfaction goal, the sustainability goal was put in an 
inferior status and the program-implementation trajectory was altered. Environmental 
programs usually involve both local interests as well as broader public interests (Lane & 
McDonald, 2005). Regionally beneficial decisions may have adverse consequences locally, 
and vice versa. The short term and parochial focus of community-based interests present a  
risk of diverting policy outcome when policies involve much public influence (Leach, 
Mearns, & Scoones, 1999). This is especially true in Zhenjiang’s old neighborhoods. Low-
income residents remain self-interest maximizers in enhancing pleasure and avoiding pain 
(Howlett, 2018). Residents care more about small and short-term interests like the kitchen 
garden or the window lighting but do not care much about whether the stormwater is 
managed through green or gray measures. However, SCP’s goals of sustainable stormwater 
management entail establishing as many green measures in neighborhoods as possible. 
When multiple goals have severe interest conflicts, implementers resort to “satisfying” 
solutions rather than optimal or desirable ones (Gilson, 2015). They must compromise 
between program expectations and what they can feasibly achieve, predicting the impact 
of client compliance on policy efficiency and effectiveness (Howlett, 2018). In SCP, 
implementers prioritized residents’ needs in the hope of minimizing vandalism and 
facilitating the implementation process. Resident satisfaction became an important action 
guideline of frontline implementers. Accordingly, the flood recurrence standard was 
increased to 30-years, which greatly exceeded the GI’s functioning capacity, and SCP was 
combined with retrofit programs. Through this route, many non-listed neighborhoods were 
incorporated into the retrofit lists, and some green spaces were turned into parking lots.  
These discretions not only changed the trajectory of policy implementation, but also 




sustainability goal. Here the resources include both time and funding. Multiple goals make 
it more difficult for implementers to concentrate efforts effectively (Jung, 2014). In 
particular, an expanded “SCP + retrofit” program will require implementers to collaborate 
with various stakeholders, including many relevant departments and residents. O'Toole Jr 
and Montjoy (1984) warn that inter-organizational implementation tends to encounter more 
delay and failure than would intra-organizational implementation. In the case of Zhenjiang, 
the hundreds of meetings among a myriad of government departments had become very 
time-consuming and daunting. The program implementation became slow and tedious. As 
to the residents, given the knowledge gaps in public engagement (Leach et al., 1999), 
implementers had to spend time on solving problems both relevant and non-relevant to 
flooding, responding to resident’s demands both reasonable and unreasonable. SCP had a 
three-year implementation period to complete hundreds of projects, leaving only a few 
months to complete each project. Frontline implementers must balance between the 
expectations of the program and what they are able to accomplish (Lipsky, 2010). While 
struggling to catch up with the schedule, they paid less attention to the quality of each 
project, including SCP’s green nature. For instance, they handled the problem of parking-
space shortage simply by removing some green spaces. The time constraint precluded 
implementers from finding sustainable solutions, such as shared parking spaces with 
nearby entities or vertical parking lots, which could solve the parking problem while 
preserving the existing green spaces.  In addition to the time resource, SCP’s funding was 
also diverted from flooding mitigation. In an expanded “SCP + retrofit” program, only 
three out of the eight task categories really related to stormwater management. To meet the 
raised flood-recurrence standard, two-thirds of funds went to gray infrastructure, and the 
remaining one-third had to be shared between GIs and neighborhood retrofit. The resource 
deviations went so extreme that frontline implementers were risking their political 
accountability, when neighborhood retrofits that had no flooding mitigation connection 
were difficult to justify to central government financial auditors.  
Implementers’ discretion in deciding the order of interests and goals can help 
streamline the implementation process by boosting resident’s compliance. Yet such 




existence of multiple goals without a clear hierarchical order harms the salience and 
relevance of efforts when interest conflict frequently arises (Jung, 2014). The priority 
ambiguity is an important dimension of goal ambiguity that affects the sustainability goal 
achievement. The program’s sustainability focus was largely diluted and diverted. Goltz, 
Mayer, and Orr (2020) illustrate that without addressing local concerns, sustainable 
development interventions are rarely sustained. In this research, when addressing too many 
of residents’ concerns, the sustainable interventions are hardly sustained, either. 
4.5.2  Goal evaluation ambiguity  
While policy goal priority ambiguity leaves room for actors to decide which goal to 
prioritize, goal evaluation ambiguity allows implementers the discretion to decide the 
degree of their commitment to a goal and to interpret the goal performance in their own 
way. For stormwater management, it has become a consensus that the paradigm needs to 
shift from a traditional gray to a green approach, because of the substantial economic, 
environmental, and ecological benefits that GI provides (Johns, 2019). Yet, for Zhenjiang’s 
SCP, although it passed the central inspection and the residents were satisfied with the SCP 
service, to what extent the paradigm has been shifted remains unclear, as neither the 
stormwater indexes nor the resident satisfaction rate conveys any information about how 
much and how well the GIs have been applied in SCPs. In this sense, these indicators are 
far from sufficient to evaluate the sustainability goal of this program. Compared with the 
straightforward stormwater indexes and the satisfaction rate, formulating measurable 
sustainability criteria is more challenging (Hueskes, Verhoest, & Block, 2017). This is 
consistent with GI’s measurement challenges. According to the interviews with two 
drafters of the SCP Evaluation Criteria national report, the GI performance measurements 
are descriptive instead of quantified because of the difficulty for central planners to develop 
one-size-fits-all standards to adapt to local conditions. They admitted that the SCP’s 
evaluation standard is far from perfect. While for city-level implementers, the benefits of 





Bastien (2009) finds that when there are no clear goal evaluation criteria, street-level 
implementers will treat such absence as a green light. In other words, goal measurement 
ambiguity leaves implementers much freedom in deciding to what degree they commit to 
that goal. In SCP, when implementers prioritized the other two goals, the sustainability 
goal was already put in a disadvantaged position. The goal was further downplayed when 
it did not have a clear measurement. For SCP, GI’s maintenance is a perceivable burden. 
Ryan et al. (2006) suggest that when the implementation agency does not have enough 
resources to manage and maintain GIs on a long-term basis, they may count on private 
entities or the public to share this burden. In cities like Cleveland and Milwaukee, the 
management and maintenance burden precluded the sewer authority from using a GI 
approach (Keeley et al., 2013). In Zhenjiang, when both GI’s maintenance responsibility 
and budget were not clear, implementers chose to reduce some feasible GI measures, 
including scaling down the rain barrel plan and using shingle roofs instead of green roofs. 
Without clear measurement, implementers were actually granted substantial freedom to 
decide how much GIs to be used in SCP. This points to the importance of establishing some 
basic sustainability targets, which can prevent GIs from being crowded out, secure funding 
for GIs, and encourage more GI installation (Johns, 2019). 
Without clear goal evaluation criteria, frontline implementers may also believe that 
their own evaluation criteria would match the organization’s criteria (Bastien, 2009). When 
there were no specific indicators to evaluate the sustainability goal, all actors had their own 
way to explain what sustainability means. For local implementers, Zhenjiang’s SCP 
implementation had been successfully completed when the three indexes of stormwater 
management were achieved, residents were satisfied with SCP, and the sustainability goal 
was attained by the installation of various GIs, such as rain gardens, bioswales, rain barrels, 
and green roofs in old neighborhoods. Nevertheless, most of these green measures were 
established more in a demonstration way, rather than being extensively and intensively 
used to solve the water problems. For central inspectors, without clear performance 
indicators, they cannot precisely evaluate how green the pilot city’s SCP is. These may 
explain why sustainability considerations currently play only a limited role in many urban 





When a central policy is implemented top-down, the layered cross-level goals become 
incoherent and cause policy goal ambiguity, which substantially deviates the policy process 
and outcome. Neither the goal priority ambiguity nor the measurement ambiguity is 
beneficial to the sustainability goal achievement in a complex implementation setting. 
Policy goal priority ambiguity allows implementers the freedom to decide which goal to 
prioritize when interest conflicts arise in the implementation process, which puts the 
sustainability goal in an inferior position. Goal measurement ambiguity further allows 
policy actors to decide how much they may commit to a goal and to interpret the service 
performance in their own way. In SCP, when no specific indicators were available to 
evaluate the sustainability goal, some small-scale GI demonstration projects symbolized 
sustainability, which substantially undermined the green tenet of SCP. 
As can be learned from this SCP case, clearly specified goal priority and measurement 
may bolster the goal achievement, though clarity is not always possible (Chun & Rainey, 
2005). In a top-down policy implementation system, the high-level decision-makers may 
prioritize their policy objectives, which can ensure their preferred policy goals are achieved 
at the local level (Gao, 2009). Although it is difficult for central decision-makers to 
establish one-size-fits-all sustainability measurements, they can require local implementers 
to develop some basic performance indicators based on local conditions, which can ensure 
the implementer’s commitment and prevent misinterpretation. 
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 Table 4.4 Main policy actors involved in Zhenjiang SCP implementation 
Central government: Commissioned SCP to pilot cites, including Zhenjiang 
City level Role Members 





Deputy Director: Vice Mayor 
Member: Representatives from different public 
agencies, including planning, housing, electricity, 
energy, water, transportation, environment, as well as 
some relevant Districts. 
SCP headquarters 
(ad hoc) 
Director: Vice Mayor 
Deputy Director: Director of the Municipal Bureau of 
Housing and Urban & Rural Development (BHURD) 
Deputy Secretary-General of the municipal 
government 







Office Chief:   Director of BHURD 
Deputy Chief: Consultant of Bureau of Finance 
                     Deputy director of the Bureau of Water 
Resource 
Implementation 
                     Deputy Director of BHURD 
Members from the Municipal Administrative Division 






Professionals from Herrera Environmental Consultants 
(US), CPG Corporation (Singapore), Shanghai Water 
Planning& Design Institute, Zhenjiang Planning & 
Design Institute, ManJiangChun Urban Planning & 













Commission director and employees. (The commission 





Source: compiled by authors, part of data from Zhenjiang. gov.cn 
 
Table 4.5 A list of interviewees 
 Affiliation of interviewees Number. of 
interviewees 
1.  The Municipal Bureau of Housing and Urban & Rural 
Development  
1 
2.  Zhenjiang Planning & Design Institute 2 
3.  Municipal Administrative Office of Water Supply and Drainage 2 
4.  Municipal Bureau of Transport 1 
5.  Neighborhood Commission  3 
6.  ManJiangChun Urban Planning & Design Co. Ltd.  1 
7.  Zhenjiang EverBright Water Co. Ltd. 1 
8.  Zhenjiang SCP expert 1 
9.  Drafter of Sponge City Guide/Evaluation Criteria (National 
Report) 
2 













5. Conclusions  
“Sustainable city” is a broad topic. This dissertation investigates two aspects of green 
space provision and stormwater management in cities. However, as is obvious, the relevant 
policy-making and implementation are very complex. This may be partially because many 
urban sustainability policies or programs resemble policy experiments. In this dissertation, 
the first two policies are innovated at the local level, while the second two are central 
policies tried out at the local level. The four chapters also represent different stages in a 
typical public-policy process. Ch. 1 deals with a policy entrepreneur, which happens at the 
initial agenda-setting stage. Ch. 2&3 discuss policy tools, which are used in the policy 
design and implementation stage. Ch. 4 involves how the policy goal design influences 
policy outcome, which links the policy formation stage with the policy evaluation stage. 
5.1 Chapter review 
Bottom-up innovations are based on local situations and show better chances to 
succeed. Chapter 1 tells the story of how an individual’s efforts can be decisive in driving 
a city’s green roof policy innovation. The policy entrepreneur is a proactive insider. 
Vertical greening’s esoteric nature implies that initially it was overlooked by the local 
government and was almost invisible to the media and the general public. The policy 
entrepreneur put it on the policy agenda and looked ahead to implementation, trying to 
remove barriers to adoption. All of her political, technical, and publicity efforts were 
focused on facilitating the implementation of vertical greening. Her efforts in Shanghai set 
an example for other cities in China, which have subsequently advanced this vertical 
greening innovation. 
The green roof regulation presented in Ch. 1 engages green roofs as non-profit public 
goods. Ch. 2 points to the insufficiency of such public policies in response to the private 
sector’s provision of shopping mall roof gardens, in the form of club goods. When the 
public policies are designed only for public goods, they fail to internalize the club good’s 




support, there are financial, legitimacy, and oversight gaps. For now, when the pioneering 
one-third of malls have established roof gardens but are struggling with the sustainability 
problem, and the other two-thirds of malls have not taken action yet, it is important to 
provide a timely and sufficient institutional response.  
Compared with a club-good approach, PPP is a more popular way of the private sector’s 
engagement in public service provision.  PPP’s application to non-revenue generating 
environment services is an unprecedented yet bold initiative in a public-dominant political 
system, especially when the institutional environment is not ready yet (S. Zhang, Gao, Feng, 
& Sun, 2015). Although the central government is eager to include the private sector and 
seeks to establish ‘real PPPs’, it becomes inoperable when partners are inexperienced and 
the market is less supportive. PPPs thus transitioned to QPPPs with high degrees of public 
control. Instead of sharing the government’s financial debts, QPPPs have become saddled 
with tremendous hidden debt, which revolves back to local governments.  
Finally, SCP as a policy experiment provided the pilot cities the opportunities to try out 
sustainable stormwater management. However, in a cross-level implementation system, 
goal ambiguity, especially the goal priority ambiguity and measurement ambiguity, largely 
compromised the policy outcome, as priority ambiguity leaves implementers the discretion 
to decide which goal to take precedence, while measurement ambiguity allows actors to 
interpret the service performance in their own way. These discretions largely compromised 
the sustainability goal. 
5.2 Limitations with this research  
This dissertation uses causal case study approaches. Flyvbjerg (2006) suggests that a 
single case study can provide valid research outcomes when the case in question is 
supposed to be sufficient and illustrative enough. The four cases in this research are 
selected mainly because they are critical and unusual. For instance, in Chapters 1&2, both 
the two Shanghai cases are picked because Shanghai is the pioneering city in green roof 
development, with the green roofs provided either as public goods or club goods. Another 




development in this city, which to some degree ensures data availability and validity. In 
Chapters 3&4, the Zhenjiang case and the eco-environment service sector are selected also 
because of their distinctiveness. In this sense, the overall replication logic is not the priority 
of this research. According to Yin (2017), a case study must be distinguished from the 
sampling logic commonly used in surveys for three reasons. First, a case study is not the 
best method for and thus should not be used to assess the prevalence of phenomena. 
Second, an individual case study would have to cover both the phenomenon of interest and 
its context, yielding many potentially relevant variables. This would require an impossibly 
large sample of cases—too large to allow more than a superficial examination of any given 
case. Third, if a sampling logic had to be applied to all types of research, many important 
topics could not be empirically investigated. For these reasons, the findings of this research 
are better to be understood as the phenomena of interest rather than the phenomena of 
prevalence. 
However, other research methods like surveys and statistics could also be used for next-
step research. Using a survey, while abiding by certain principles such as ensuring 
representativeness, minimizing bias, and improving response rate by following procedures 
in handling the data, I will be able to enhance the external validity of the study. For 
instance, when more cities start to mandate green roof policies on new buildings, I can 
examine whether these followers are adopting the green roof policy because of policy 
entrepreneurship or because of policy learning. Policy entrepreneurship is the main driver 
of policy change (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). However, when the pioneering city has 
already developed and implemented policies successfully, other cities may simply 
“borrow” such policies without strong pushes from a policy entrepreneur, which is of 
course not always available. So I can use a survey to identify the drivers of green roof 
policy change. In a similar vein, I can use a survey to understand why green roof adoption 
remains low in the Sponge City program to find the influencing factors such as policy, 
technology, and physical barriers (roof structure and load).  
In this research, each chapter uses a case to explain a “why” or “how” research question 




which the outcome is drawn. In order to answer the research question, causal relationships 
between events need to be identified. Causal case studies tell a story of a 
sequence of events or processes and use these events or processes to build explanatory 
theories that derive from this story (Beach & Pedersen, 2016). For future research, I can 
conduct causal case studies more rigorously. Given the societal context, there could be the 
case of unifinality, multifinality, or equifinality (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Lindquist & 
Wellstead, 2018). It means that the same effect could be caused by various mechanisms or 
vice versa. In this line of thinking, the mechanism provides an explanation about the 
outcomes. Moreover, the role of the mechanism is not limited to explanation, it has also 
the potential to distinguish true causal relations from spurious correlations.  Obviously, the 
causal mechanism approach would help identify important variables and detect the causal 
relationship between the variables. 
5.3 Future research 
Policy innovation always depends upon a reformer’s commitments. A policy 
entrepreneur is more likely to succeed at the local level or at a small scale where an 
entrepreneur’s capacity is sufficient to influence all three policy streams towards successful 
policy change (Cairney, 2018). ‘Trivial’ topics like vertical greening usually lack outside 
catalysts as they do not attract much attention from interest groups, the public, or the media. 
In this sense, entrepreneurship as a powerful internal driver contributes to the overall policy 
change. It is worthwhile to look also at other sectors with various political and vested 
interest stakeholders. It would be expected that other entrepreneurial strategies to earn 
political capital are needed towards desirable policy change (He, 2018).  
Collaborative governance towards public good provision, especially the non-profit-
generating green space, remains rare. Both the club-good approach and the PPP approach 
to urban green space development deserve more research attention. This points to future 
research potential to explore the enabling institutional environment. SMRG can be 
regarded as a type of voluntary environmental program that provides positive externalities 




voluntary innovation, it is worthwhile for the government to take proactive measures to 
direct the voluntary program towards a more sustainable outcome. Future research can 
focus on how the greening department acts as a policy entrepreneur to build allies with 
other departments in creating a more conducive institutional environment. As to the other 
market-based solution of QPPP, this research is limited to the eco-environment service 
sector in China. Of special interest is a more wide-ranging study to examine how the new 
private-SOEs consortium influences QPPP projects, including potentially reducing the 
lending bias and financing cost compared with the solely private partner. 
Finally, policy goal ambiguity is a well-studied theoretical topic. In this research, it 
proves to be especially detrimental to the sustainability goal achievement when both the 
goal priority and measurement are vague. It would be helpful to do some comparative 
research, for instance, in a matrix of goal priority clarity/ambiguity and goal measurement 
clarity/ambiguity to see how different combinations of ambiguity/clarity may influence the 
policy outcome. Nevertheless, although goal clarity is important to the sustainability goal 
achievement, other supporting policies are also critical. For instance, in the Sponge City 
program, stronger incentives for green roofs could mobilize more private developers, as 
shown in the SMRG case. For the moment, except for some metropolitan cities like 
Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Beijing, most sponge pilot cities have not institutionalized green 
roofs in their municipal laws. Once various regulations or incentive policies are in place, 
green roofs will be generalized more easily.    
5.4 Advice for policymakers 
For policymakers, it would be beneficial to understand the positive and encouraging 
outcomes from a policy entrepreneur’s efforts. That Shanghai became the first city in the 
nation to mandate vertical greening can be largely attributed to the policy entrepreneur’s 
initiative and perseverance. This may shed light on other cases or scenarios. For example, 
as to the SMRG case, the greening department (as the advocacy agent) can act as a policy 
entrepreneur and build allies with both the water and the planning departments, to shepherd 




a similar vein, policy entrepreneurship may also propose stronger incentives for green 
infrastructure in Sponge City programs. 
 In addition to the role of policy entrepreneurship, policymakers may also examine the 
effectiveness of policy tool design. Existing policy tools are largely designed for the 
scenarios of government direct provision of public goods. Nevertheless, when the private 
sector is involved in public goods provision, the intrinsic sectoral interest conflicts will 
entail policy tool redesign to take the private partner’s interests into consideration. Such 
interests may include both a green reputation and monetary benefits. In this sense, the 
government can encourage the enterprises to voluntarily fulfill their corporate social 
responsibility by establishing green roofs. For large scale green infrastructure projects, the 
government would need to design policy tools to ensure that benefits can cover the 
production costs and to allow the private sector to be self-sustaining through motivating 
the private sector to consistently contribute to public/club goods provision. Otherwise, the 
initial voluntary engagement may degrade and become unsustainable as in both the SMRG 
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